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1. Introduction 
 
Scientific discourse is rife with passages that appear to be ordinary descriptions of systems of 
interest in a particular discipline. Equally, the pages of textbooks and journals are filled with 
discussions of the properties and the behaviour of those systems. Students of mechanics 
investigate at length the dynamical properties of a system consisting of two or three spinning 
spheres with homogenous mass distributions gravitationally interacting only with each other. 
Population biologists study the evolution of one species procreating at a constant rate in an 
isolated ecosystem. And when studying the exchange of goods, economists consider a 
situation in which there are only two goods, two perfectly rational agents, no restrictions on 
available information, no transaction costs, no money, and dealings are done immediately. 
Their surface structure notwithstanding, no competent scientist would mistake descriptions of 
such systems as descriptions of an actual system: we know very well that there are no such 
systems. These descriptions are descriptions of a model-system, and scientists use model-
systems to represent parts or aspects of the world they are interested in. Following common 
practice, I refer to those parts or aspects as target-systems.  
 
What are we to make of this? Is discourse about such models merely a picturesque and 
ultimately dispensable façon de parler? This was the view of some early twentieth century 
philosophers. Duhem (1906) famously guarded against confusing model building with 
scientific theorising and argued that model building has no real place in science,beyond a 
minor heuristic role. The aim of science was, instead, to construct theories with theories  
understood as classificatory or representative structures systematically presented and 
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formulated in precise symbolic language. With some modifications this view also become 
dominant among the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group; see, for 
instance, Carnap (1938) and Hempel (1965).  
 
Early resistance against this understanding of science came from Campbell (1920) and Hesse 
(1963), who emphasised the importance of models to scientific theorising. The tides changed 
in the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand the positivist view that theories were partially 
interpreted logical calculi (now referred to as the ‘syntactic view of theories’) was replaced by 
the so-called semantic view of theories, according to which a theory simply is a collection of 
models; see Suppe (1977). Parallel, but by and large unrelated to the rise of the semantic 
view, a tradition of philosophy of science arose that emphasises the importance of scientific 
practice to philosophical analysis, and so places models again at the heart of a philosophical 
account of science; see the essays collected in Morgan and Morrison (1999). Hence, current 
philosophies of science of all stripes agree with a characterisation of science as an activity 
aiming at representing parts of the world with the aid of scientific models.  
 
For this reason the questions of what scientific modes are and how they represent have 
become central to the concerns of philosophers of science. This chapter proposes a novel 
approach to the issue of models and representation, one that draws essentially on the analogy 
between models and literary fiction. But before we can sketch the outlines of this account, 
some setting up is needed.  
 
As the above examples show, when presenting a model scientists offer us the description of a 
hypothetical system, one that does not actually exist in nature, which they proffer as an object 
of study.2 Scientists sometimes express this fact by saying that they talk about	  ‘model-­‐land’;	  
see	   for	   instance	   	   Smith	   (2007,	   135).	  The rationale for doing so is that this hypothetical 
system has two desirable properties. First, it is chosen such that it is easier to study than the 
target-system and therefore allows us to derive results. Second, it is assumed to represent its 
target system, and representation is something like a ‘licence to draw inferences’. 
Representation allows us to ‘carry over’ results obtained in the model to the target-system and 
hence it enables us to learn something about that system by studying the model.  
                                                
2 Some scientific models are material objects (for instance the wood models of care that we put into a wind 
tunnel), but most models are not of this kind. I here focus on models that are, in Hacking’s (1983, 216) words, 
‘something you hold in your head rather than your hands’.  
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Thus, scientists actually perform two acts when they propose a model: they introduce a 
hypothetical system as the object of study, and they claim that this system is a representation 
of a target-system of interest. This is reflected in the promiscuous usage of the term ‘model’ 
in the sciences. On the one hand ‘model’ is often used to denote the hypothetical system we 
study (e.g. when we say that the model consists of two spheres). On the other hand it is 
employed to indicate that a certain system represents, or stands for, another system (e.g. when 
we observe that the Newtonian model of the solar system misrepresents its target in various 
ways). In practice, however, these two acts are often carried out in tandem and scientists 
therefore rarely, if ever, clearly distinguish the two.  
 
While this may well be a legitimate way of proceeding efficiently in the heat of battle, it is 
detrimental to philosophical analysis where it is germane that these two acts be kept separate. 
In this chapter I endeavour to clearly separate these two acts and to present an analysis of 
each. To this end, let me first introduce some terminology. I use the term ‘model-system’ to 
denote the hypothetical system proffered as an object of study. I call those descriptions that 
are used to introduce the model-system as ‘model-descriptions’. Representation then is the 
relation between a model-system and its target-system.  The term ‘model’ could refer to either 
the model-system or representation, or the combination of the two, or yet other things; I will 
therefore avoid it in what follows. I use the term ‘modelling’ to refer to the practice of 
devising, describing and using a model-system. In this more regimented language, the two 
acts performed in utterances of the kind mentioned above are, first, presenting a model-system 
and specifying some of its essential properties, and, second, endowing this model-system with 
representational power.  
 
This separation may do some violence to common sense, which regards representational 
power as an intrinsic to things that are models and sees this dissociation of model-systems 
from representation as artificial at best. Common sense is wrong. It has been pointed out 
variously – and in my view correctly – that, in principle, anything can be a representation of 
anything else.3 Representations are not a distinctive ontological category and it is wrong to 
believe that some objects are, intrinsically, representations and other are not. It is one question 
to ask what an object is in itself; but it is quite a different one to ask what, if anything, an 
                                                
3 The point is Goodman’s (1976); in recent years Teller (2001), Giere (2004) and Callender and Cohen (2006) 
have discussed it with special focus on scientific representation. 
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object represents and in what way. Taking model-systems to be intrinsically representational 
is a fundamental mistake. Model-systems, first and foremost are objects of sorts, which can, 
and de facto often are, used as representations of a target-system. But the intrinsic nature of a 
model-system does not depend on whether or not it is so used: representation is extrinsic to 
the medium doing the representing.  
 
Hence, understanding scientific modelling can be divided into two sub-projects: analysing 
what model-systems are, and understanding how they are used to represent something beyond 
themselves. The first is a prerequisite for the second: we can only start analysing how 
representation works once we understand the intrinsic character of the vehicle that does the 
representing. Coming to terms with this issue is the project of the first half of this chapter. My 
central contention is that models are akin to places and characters of literary fictions, and that 
therefore theories of fiction play an essential role in explaining the nature of model-systems. 
This sets the agenda. Section 2 provides a statement of this view, which I label the fiction 
view of model-systems, and argues for its prima facie plausibility. Section 3 presents a defence 
of this view against its main rival, the structuralist conception of models. In Section 4 I 
develop an account of model-systems as imagined objects on the basis of the so-called 
pretence theory of fiction. This theory needs to be discussed in great detail for two reasons. 
First, developing an acceptable account of imagined objects is mandatory to make the fiction 
view acceptable, and I will show that the pretence theory has the resources to achieve this 
goal. Second, the term ‘representation’ is ambiguous; in fact, there are two very different 
relations that are commonly called ‘representation’ and a conflation between the two is the 
root of some of the problems that (allegedly) beset scientific representation. Pretence theory 
provides us with the conceptual resources to articulate these two different forms of 
representation, which I call p-representation and t-representation respectively. Putting these 
elements together provides us with a coherent overall picture of scientific modelling, which I 
develop in Section 5.  
 
While p-representation turns out to be internal to pretence theory (and hence is explained by 
pretence theory itself), an analysis of t-representation has to draw on different resources. This 
resource is maps. In Section 6 I present an analysis of how maps represent their target systems 
and claim that the general structure of this account doubles as the general structure of t-
representation. In other words, the view that I am proposing is that one can think of the 
model-system as a kind of a ‘generalised map’ and explain how it represents (t-represents) its 
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target along the lines of how maps represent their targets. In Section 7 I use this view to 
analyse the Newtonian model of the solar system and show that it not only gives a plausible 
understanding of what happens in this model, but even makes important features of it visible 
that are usually concealed. Far from being an idle philosophical pastime, the fiction view of 
models, I claim in conclusion, can actually help us to better understand what is involved in the 
representational activities essential to scientific models.  
 
 
2. Model-Systems and Fiction 
 
What kind of things are model-systems? Referring to them as ‘model-systems’ has a homely 
ring to it which obscures the fact that we don’t know what they are. As we have seen, the 
descriptions in question are not descriptions of any actual system. So what, if anything, are 
they descriptions of? What sense can we make of the common practice to qualify claims about 
such systems as true or false? And how do we find out about the truth and falsity of such 
claims?  
 
My answers to these questions take as their starting point the realisation that model-systems 
share important aspects in common with literary fiction. This is more than just an interesting 
but eventually inconsequential observation. My claim is that thinking about model-systems as 
being akin to characters and places in literary fiction provides essential clues to solving 
pressing problems in the philosophy of science. In other words, drawing an analogy between 
scientific modelling and literary fiction is not idle musing; it is the driving force behind an 
approach to scientific modelling that aims to provide an understanding of a central aspect of 
scientific practice.  
 
The core of the fiction view of model-systems is the claim that model-systems are akin to 
places and characters in literary fiction. When modelling the solar system as consisting of ten 
perfectly spherical spinning tops physicists describe (and take themselves to be describing) an 
imaginary physical system; when considering an ecosystem with only one species biologist 
describe an imaginary population; and when investigating an economy without money and 
transaction costs economists describe an imaginary economy. These imaginary scenarios are 
tellingly like the places and characters in works of fiction like Madame Bovary and Sherlock 
Holmes. These are scenarios we can talk about and make claims about, yet they don’t exist.  
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Although hardly at the centre of attention, the parallels between certain aspects of science and 
literary fiction have not gone unnoticed. It has been mentioned by Maxwell, and occupied 
centre stage in Vaihinger’s (1911) philosophy of the ‘as if’. In more recent years, the parallel 
has also been drawn specifically between models and fiction. Cartwright observes that ‘a 
model is a work of fiction’ (1983, 153) and later suggests an analysis of models as fables 
(1999, Ch. 2). McCloskey (1990) regards economists as ‘tellers of stories and makers of 
poems’. Fine notes that modelling natural phenomena in every area of science involves 
fictions in Vaihinger’s sense (1993, 16), and Sklar highlights that describing system “as if” 
they were systems of some other kind is a royal route to success (2000, 71). Elgin (1996, Ch. 
6) argues that science shares important epistemic practices with artistic fiction. Hartmann 
(1999) and Morgan (2001) emphasise that stories and narratives play an important role in 
models, and Morgan (2004) stresses the importance of imagination in model building. Sugden 
(2000) points out that economic models describe ‘counterfactual worlds’ constructed by the 
modeller. I have defended the view that models are imaginary objects in my (2003) and my 
(2009), and Grüne-Yanoff and Schweinzer (2008) emphasise the importance of stories in the 
application of game theory.4 Moreover, Godfrey-Smith (2006) has recently set out what 
amounts to the most explicit and forceful statement of the fiction view of model-systems now 
available. 
 
What we have to recognise, though, is that the analogy between model-systems and fiction is 
only a starting point. If put forward without further qualifications, explaining model-systems 
in terms of fictional characters amounts to explaining the unclear by the obscure. In fact, 
fictional entities are beset with philosophical problems that are so severe that avoiding 
fictional entities altogether would appear to be a better strategy. Fictional entities do not exist: 
there is no woman called Emma Bovary and there is no detective Sherlock Holmes. Yet they 
have some kind of reality: we think about them, we talk about them, and they are objects of 
our emotions. Fictional entities are the subject matter of discussions, and claims about them 
can be true or false: we say that it is true that Holmes is a detective but false that he is a ballet 
dancer. How can this be if there is no Holmes? And how can sentences containing the name 
‘Holmes’ even be meaningful if Holmes does not exist? It seems that the sentence would then 
                                                
4 Giere (1988, Ch. 3) argues that models are ‘abstract entities’, which could be also interpreted as a fiction based 
view of models. However, in personal communication he pointed out to me that this is not his intended view.  
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be about nothing, and yet we qualify such sentences as true or false. On what grounds do we 
do this?  
 
These and other related concerns have led many philosophers to dismiss fictional entities. So 
how is appeal to something as problematic and obscure as fictional entities going to help us 
work through the thorny problem of scientific representation? Before turning to the details of 
the account that I favour (Section 4), I want to mention four reasons for believing that 
thinking about modelling in this way is helpful. 
 
First, works of fiction characteristically do not portray actual states of affairs. The names of 
persons and objects in literary fiction characteristically do not denote real persons or objects, 
and there is nothing in the world of which the text of a novel is a true description.5 
Nevertheless, fictional discourse is genuinely meaningful: readers neither make a mistake, nor 
are they under an illusion when they believe that they understand the contents of a novel. Yet, 
at the same time they are fully aware that the sentences they read when engaging with a work 
of fiction do not describe anything in the actual world. The same is true of modelling 
discourse in science. As we have seen above, scientific discourse abounds with descriptions 
that are meaningful yet fail to be plain descriptions of physical systems from the domain of 
enquiry of the scientific discipline in question.  
 
Second, we can truly say that in David Lodge’s Changing Places Morris Zapp is a professor 
of English literature at the State University of Euphoria. We can also truly say that in the 
novel he has a heart and a liver, but we cannot truly say that he is a ballet dancer or a violin 
player. Only the first of these claims is part of the explicit content of the novel, yet there is a 
matter of the fact about what is the case ‘in the world of the story’ even when claims go 
beyond what is explicitly stated. Whether or not claims about a story’s content are correct is – 
somehow – determined by the text without being part of its explicit content. Such 
determinations are not merely decided by each reader on a whim. The situation with model-
systems is the same. Model-descriptions usually only specify a handful of essential properties, 
but it is understood that the model-system has properties other than the ones mentioned in the 
description. Model-systems are interesting exactly because more is true of them than what the 
initial description specifies; no one would spend time studying model-systems if all there was 
                                                
5 This is not meant to be a definition of fiction. A failure of reference, although typical for fiction, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a text to qualify as fiction. I come back to this point later on.  
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to know about them was the explicit content of the initial description. It is, for instance, true 
that the Newtonian model-system representing the solar system is stable and that the model-
earths move in elliptical orbits; but none of this is part of the explicit content of the model-
system’s original specification.  
 
Third, a fictional story not only has content that goes beyond what is explicitly stated, we also 
have the means to learn about this ‘extra content’ by using certain (usually implicit) rules of 
inference. It is an integral part of our response to fiction that we supplement the explicit 
content and fill in facts about the plot even where the text is silent. In fact, a good part of the 
intellectual pleasure we get from reading a novel derives from this imaginative ‘filling in’ of 
the ‘missing content’. The same goes for model-systems. Finding out what is true in a model-
system beyond what is explicitly specified in the relevant description is a crucial aspect of our 
engagement with the system. In fact the bulk of the work that is done with a model-system is 
usually expended on establishing whether or not certain claims about it hold true. Is the solar 
system stable? Do the populations of predators and prey reach some equilibrium? Do prices 
stabilise? These are questions we want to answer given what we know about the model and 
certain other rules we regard as valid in the context in which the model-system is discussed.  
 
Fourth, sometimes we read just for pleasure, but in particular when we read serious literature 
we often engage in comparisons between the characters and situations in the fiction and real 
situations and characters with which we are familiar. We recognise aspects of the 
protagonist’s behaviour in someone we know and suddenly begin to understand some of his 
behavioural patterns: we learn about the world by reading fiction. Again, this has parallels in 
the context of modelling, where we learn from models about the world. Once we think about 
models as fictions this parallel becomes salient and urges us to think about how ‘knowledge 
transfer’ from a fictional scenario to the real world takes place. 
 
Needless to say, this list of communalities between scientific modelling and literary fiction is 
neither complete, nor should it be understood as suggesting that there are no important 
differences between the two. The purpose of this list is to make it plausible that thinking about 
models as alike to literary fiction is a fruitful point of departure.  
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In the next section I defend this conception of model-systems against its structuralist rival. 
Those already convinced by the fiction view can skip this section without loss and continue 
with Section 4 where I present a detailed formulation of the fiction view of models. 
 
 
3. Strictures on Structures 
 
Stop and rewind. Many will think that this discussion has taken a wrong turn right at the 
beginning and has gotten onto a path leading straight into a thicket of confusions. The wrong 
turn is to take talk about nonexistent systems seriously. Worse, trying to make good on this 
idea by working out a theory of fiction is a pilgrimage to the devil. Those whom I expect to 
issue such a verdict are those who hold the view that models are set theoretical structures. 
This view originates with Suppes (1960) and is now held by many, among them van Fraassen 
(1980; 1997; 2002), Da Costa and French (1990), and French and Ladyman (1997).  
 
At the core of this approach to models lies the notion that models are structures. A structure 
(sometimes ‘mathematical structure’ or ‘set-theoretic structure’) S is a composite entity 
consisting of a non-empty set U of individuals called the domain (or universe) of the structure 
S and a non-empty indexed set R of relations on U. Often it is convenient to write these as an 
ordered triple: S=[U, R].6  
 
For what follows it is important to be clear on what we mean by ‘individual’ and ‘relation’ in 
this context. To define the domain of a structure it does not matter what the individuals are – 
they may be whatever. The only thing that matters from a structural point of view is that there 
are so and so many of them. Or to put it another way, all we need is dummies or placeholders. 
Relations are understood in a similarly ‘deflationary’ way. It is not important what the relation 
‘in itself’ is; all that matters is between which objects it holds. For this reason, a relation is 
specified purely extensionally, that is, as class of ordered n-tuples and the relation is assumed 
to be nothing over and above this class of ordered tuples. Thus understood, relations have no 
properties other than those that derive from this extensional characterisation, such as 
                                                
6 Sometimes structures are defined so that they also include operations. Although convenient in some contexts, 
this is unnecessary because ultimately operations reduce to relations (Boolos and Jeffrey 1989, 98-99). 
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transitivity, reflexivity, symmetry, etc. This leaves us with a notion of structure containing 
dummy-objects between which purely extensionally defined relations hold.7 
 
Let us illustrate this with a simple example. Consider St = [U=(a, b, c), R=(〈a, b〉, 〈b, c〉, 〈a, 
c〉)], a structure consisting of a three object domain (with the objects a, b, and c) endowed 
with a transitive relation R, (where ‘〈a, b〉’ is an ordered tuple expressing that R holds 
between a and b).8 In fact, the formula in the previous sentence is all we need in order to 
completely define the structure. It does not matter what they objects are: their materiality is 
immaterial. It doesn’t matter whether they are books, railway bridges, or supernovae – all that 
is needed is that they are objects. In the same way it does not matter whether the relation R is 
‘greater than’ or ‘older than’ or ‘more appreciated than’ – all that matters is that R holds 
between a and b, and b and c, and a and c, no matter what R ‘in itself’ is.  
 
A view that takes model-systems in science to be structures in this sense is too austere to 
serve as a basis for an account of scientific modelling. Although structures do play an 
important role in scientific modelling, model-systems cannot be identified with structures. 
What is missing in the structuralist conception is an analysis of the ‘material’ character of 
model-systems: even perfectly spherical planets are taken to have mass, populations are taken 
to consist of rabbits and foxes, etc. The view of model-systems that I advocate regards model-
systems as imagined physical systems, i.e. as hypothetical entities that, as a matter of fact, do 
not exist spatio-temporally but nevertheless have non-structural properties in the same way in 
which literary characters do. I will explain below in detail how to understand this claim and 
address the problems that it faces. The aim of this section is to argue that this is the right way 
of thinking about model-systems.  
 
There are several reasons to prefer this take on model-systems over the structuralist account. 
The first is the evidence from scientific practice: scientists often talk about model-systems as 
if they were physical things. Young and Freedman, when presenting their model of the 
baseball in the above quote, do not say that they present a mathematical structure. Rather they 
                                                
7 See Russell (1919, 60) for clear account of this feature of structures.  
8 A relation is transitive iff it is true that whenever the relation holds between objects a and b, and between b and 
c, then it also holds between a and c. Examples for transitive relations are more expensive than and taller than; 
and example for a non-transitive relation is liking (since it may well be that a likes b, and b likes c, but a does 
not like c at all).  
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describe a hypothetical situation in which a rigid ball moves without air resistance and in the 
absence of other confounding factors. This way of thinking about model-systems is typical in 
mechanics as well as many branches of physics. And the same is true in biology. Godfrey-­‐
Smith	  (2006,	  736-­‐8)	  points	  out	  that	  Levins’	  work	  on	  population	  biology	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
models	  of	  Maynard	  Smith	  and	  Szathmáry’s	  in	  evolutionary	  theory,	  and	  hence	  most	  of	  the	  
work	   in	   their	   respective	   fields	   –	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   describing	   imagined	   concrete	  
populations.	  Further,	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  adds	  that	   this	  way	  of	   looking	  at	  model-­‐systems	   in	  
these	  fields	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  novel	  phenomena	  and	  to	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  
treatment	  of	  certain	  issues	  (e.g.	  the	  discussion	  of	  robustness	  in	  Levins),	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  
communication	   of	   the	   results	   in	   books	   and	   papers,	   even	   where	   the	   models	   make	  
essential	  use	  of	  mathematical	  techniques.	   
	  
Closely	  related	  to	  this	  point	   is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fictional	  scenario	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  
understanding	   how	   a	   model	   relates	   to	   reality.	   This	   is	   best	   illustrated	   with	   a	   simple	  
example	   from	  population	  dynamics.9	   Imagine	  you	  have	  a	  newborn	  pair	  of	   rabbits,	  one	  
male	  the	  other	  female,	  and	  you	  also	  have	  a	  large	  garden	  which	  is	  their	  habitat.	  You	  then	  
want	   to	  know	  how	  many	  pairs	  of	  rabbits	  you	  will	  have	  at	  some	   later	   time,	  and	  so	  you	  
turn	   to	   a	   text	   on	   population	   dynamics	  where	   you	   find	   a	   simple	  model	   (going	   back	   to	  
Leonardo	  of	  Pisa,	  also	  known	  by	  his	  nickname	  ‘Fibonacci’).	  The	  model	  tells	  you	  that	  the	  
population	  at	   time	  tn	  equals	  the	  population	  at	   time	  tn-­‐1	  plus	  the	  population	  at	   time	  tn-­‐2.	  
According	  to	  the	  model,	  then,	  we	  have	  P(tn)=P(tn-­‐1)+P(tn-­‐2),	  where	  P(tn)	  is	  the	  population	  
at	  time	  tn	  and	  where	  the	  distance	  between	  two	  instants	  of	  time	  is	  the	  time	  rabbits	  need	  
to	  mature	   and	   breed	   (the	   numbers	  P(tn)	   are	   known	   as	   ‘Fibonacci	   numbers’).10	   Let	   us	  
assume	  this	  time	  is	  one	  month.	  Thus,	  the	  model	  tells	  us	  that	  if	  we	  start	  with	  one	  young	  
pair,	  we	   have	   five	   pairs	   after	   five	  months,	   eight	   pairs	   after	   six	  months,	   thirteen	   pairs	  
after	  seven	  months,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  now	  getting	  excited	  because	  you	  figure	  that	  your	  rabbit	  population	  will	  grow	  
really	   fast	   (after	   ten	  months	  you	  already	  have	   fifty-­‐five	  pairs	   according	   to	   the	  model),	  
                                                
9 For a discussion of this example see Smith (2007, 24-29). 
10 Strictly speaking this is not a structural formulation of the model, but a structural version could easily be 
constructed from the equation defining the Fibonacci numbers. However, since such a construction requires 
some setting up (as the example in Section 9 below shows) and nothing in my conclusion depends on having 
such a formulation, I will not dwell on this point here.  
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you	  will	  be	  disappointed.	  Quite	  soon	  the	  real	  number	  of	  rabbit	  pairs	  will	  start	  diverging	  
dramatically	   from	   the	   value	   the	  model	   predicts.	   This	  may	   take	   you	  by	   surprise,	   but	   it	  
should	  not	  if	  you	  understand	  the	  entire	  model.	  The	  above	  equation	  is	  not	  about	  rabbits	  
per	   se;	   it	   is	   about	   rabbits	   that	   never	  die,	   a	   garden	   that	   is	   infinitely	   large	   and	   contains	  
enough	  food	  for	  any	  number	  of	  rabbits,	  and	  rabbits	  that	  procreate	  at	  a	  constant	  rate	  at	  
constant	   speed.	   This	   is	   not	   by	   any	   standards	   an	   accurate	   description	   of	   the	   real	  
situation;	   it	   is	   a	   fictional	   scenario	  and	  P(tn)=P(tn-­‐1)+P(tn-­‐2)	   is	   true	  of	   this	   scenario.	   It	   is	  
crucial	  to	  appreciate	  this	  fact	  if	  we	  want	  to	  know	  under	  what	  circumstances	  and	  to	  what	  
extent	  conclusions	  derived	  in	  the	  model	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  bear	  out	  in	  the	  real	  system.	  
Real	  rabbits	  don’t	  live	  forever,	  but	  they	  live	  for	  some	  years;	  the	  garden	  is	  not	  infinite	  but	  
large	  enough	  to	  provide	  food	  and	  shelter	  for	  about	  one	  hundred	  pairs;	  etc.	  So	  we	  come	  
to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  model	  is	  probably	  good	  for	  about	  the	  first	  nine	  or	  ten	  months	  and	  
then	  starts	  breaking	  down.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  know	  when	  using	  the	  model,	  but	  –	  and	  
this	  is	  the	  crucial	  point	  –	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  mathematics	  that	  tells	  you	  any	  of	  this!	  
What	   makes	   you	   understand	   the	   how	   the	   model	   relates	   to	   the	   world	   and	   when	   and	  
where	  you	  can	  reasonably	  use	  it	  is	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  fictional	  scenario	  and	  the	  
real	  world.	  So	  the	  fictional	  scenario	  is	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  the	  model,	  and	  one	  that	  
cannot	  be	  eliminated	  and	  replaced	  by	  structures.	  	  
 
Some might now reply that the fictional scenario merely plays a pragmatic role in our use of 
the model (whatever that means) and can therefore be eliminated in a final formulation of the 
model. I disagree because, as I have just outlined, the fictional scenario is essential to the 
functioning of the model. But irrespective of how this issue is resolved, the structuralist 
conception of models faces further difficulties when we think about how a model comes to be 
a representation of a target-system.  
 
A structure per se is not about anything at all, let alone about a particular target-system; they 
are pieces of pure mathematics, devoid of empirical content. But a representation must posses 
‘semantic content’ or ‘aboutness’; that is, it must stand for something else. Those who take 
model-systems to be structures suggest connecting structures to target-systems by setting up 
an isomorphism between model-system and target.11 Two structures S=[U, R] and ST=[UT, RT] 
are isomorphic iff there exists an isomorphism between them. An isomorphism is a mapping f: 
                                                
11 Other suggestions include partial isomorphism, homomorphism, and embedding – nothing in what follows 
depends on which on of these one chooses. 
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UT → U such that f is one-to-one (bijective) and it preserves the system of relations in the 
following sense: the elements a1, ..., an of ST satisfy the relation RT iff the corresponding 
elements b1=f(a1), ..., bn=f(an) in S satisfy R, where R is the relation in S corresponding to RT.  
 
This definition of isomorphism brings a predicament to the fore: a morphism holds between 
two structures and not between a structure and a part of the world per se. In order to make 
sense of the notion that there is an isomorphism between a model-system and its target-
system, we have to assume that the target exemplifies a particular structure. The problem is 
that this cannot be had without bringing non-structural features into play.  
 
The argument for this claim proceeds in two steps (Frigg 2006, 55-56). The first is to realise 
that possessing structure S (where S is some particular structure) is a concept that does not 
apply unless some more concrete concepts apply as well. Hence we cannot say that a target-
system has structure S unless we also say that it has certain more concrete properties as well. 
Let us make this more precise with the notion of one concept being more abstract than another 
concept.  
 
Concept a is more abstract than concept b iff b belongs to a class B of concepts (and a ∉ B) 
such that12   
 
(i) for a to apply it is necessary that at least one b’∈ B applies, and,  
(ii) on any given occasion, the fact that b’∈ B applies is what the applying of a on that 
occasion consists in.  
 
In other words, the concepts in B are use to ‘fit out’ the abstract concept a on any given 
occasion. Working, for instance, is more abstract in this sense than writing a letter or 
attending a meeting. Condition (i) says that for it to be the case that I am working, I either 
have to write a letter, attend a meeting, or …; if I don’t do any of these, then I am not 
working. Condition (ii) says that my working on a given occasion consists in, say, writing a 
letter. If I complain to someone that I have been writing letters all day, and he then replies 
‘OK, but when did you work?’ he is either making a joke or does not get the point (namely 
that writing letters is working). In other words, the two conditions say that there is no such 
thing as working and only working.  
                                                
12 This definition is adapted from Cartwright (1999, 39).  
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Having structure S is like working in that it needs fitting out on every occasion in which it 
applies. It follows from the definition of a structure that for something to have structure S it 
has to be the case that being an object must apply to some of its parts, and standing in a 
relation R (where R is one of the relations of S) must apply to these. These concepts are 
abstract relative to more concrete concepts. Let us take relations first. Recall that relations are 
defined purely extensionally and hence have nothing but logico-mathematical properties such 
as transitivity. Consider, then, standing in a transitive relation. There are many transitive 
relations: taller than, older than, hotter than, heavier than, stronger than, more expensive 
than, more recent than (and their respective converses: smaller than, younger than, etc.), and 
with a little ingenuity one can extend this list ad libitum. By itself, there is nothing worrying 
about that. However, what we have to realise is that standing in a transitive relation applies to 
two objects only if either greater than, or older than, or … applies to them as well. We cannot 
have the former without the latter: something cannot be a transitive relation without also 
being one of the above listed relations. Being taller than, say, is what being a transitive 
relation consists in on a particular occasion. So standing in a transitive relation is abstract 
relative to more concrete concepts like being hotter than and, hence there simply is no such 
thing in the physical world as a relation that is nothing but transitive.  
 
Similarly for objects. What is needed for something to be an object is not an easy question, 
and an answer depends on the relevant context as well as the kinds of things we are dealing 
with (medium size physical objects like tables, social entities such as families, etc.). But 
nothing in the world is such that the only property it possesses is ‘objectness’; whatever the 
circumstances, some other concepts must apply to it for it to be the case that it is an object. 
For instance, a medium size physical object has an identifiable shape which sets it off from 
the environment, which implies that it is coloured, has a certain texture, etc. If none of this 
was the case, we just would not have a medium size physical object.  
 
The crucial point in all this is that the more concrete concepts that are needed to ground 
structural claims are not structural themselves. Being a transitive relation is structural, being 
taller than is not, as becomes clear from has been said about structures above. In other words, 
structural claims ride on the back of non-structural claims.  
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This	  by	  itself	  would	  not	  have	  to	  worry	  the	  structuralist	  who	  claims	  that	  model-­‐systems	  
are	   structures.	   He	   could	   point	   out	   that	   although,	   as	   the	   above	   argument	   shows,	  
structures	  are	  grounded	  in	  something	  else	  (which	  is	  non-­‐structural),	  it	  is	  the	  structural	  
features	  of	   reality	   that	  models	   relate	   to	  and	   that	   therefore	  models	   are	   structures.	  The	  
problem	  with	   this	   response	   –	   and	   this	   is	   the	   second	   step	   of	   the	   argument	   –	   becomes	  
apparent	  when	  we	  realise	  that	  the	  descriptions	  we	  choose	  to	  fit	  out	  abstract	  structural	  
claims	   almost	   never	   are	   true	   descriptions	   of	   the	   target	   systems.	   The	   above	   examples	  
make	   this	   sufficiently	   clear.	   The	   structure	   on	  which	   the	   formal	   treatment	   of	   the	   solar	  
system	  is	  based	  is	  not	   fitted	  out	  by	  a	  realistic	  description	  of	  the	  solar	  system,	  but	  by	  a	  
description	  that	  takes	  planets	  to	  be	  ideal	  spheres	  with	  homogenous	  mass	  distributions	  
gravitationally	  interacting	  only	  with	  each	  other	  and	  nothing	  else.	  Similarly,	  the	  structure	  
on	  which	  the	  calculations	  of	  the	  population	  sizes	  is	  based	  does	  not	  attach	  to	  a	  realistic	  
description	   of	   animal	   life	   and	   so	   on.	   So	   the	   structural	   claims	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   the	  
equations	   that	   we	   study	   when	   dealing	   with	   a	   problem	   at	   hand	   (at	   least	   in	   the	  
overwhelming	   majority	   of	   cases)	   are	   not	   true	   descriptions	   of	   the	   target	   system,	   and	  
hence	  the	  target	  does	  not	  have	  the	  structure	  at	  stake.13	   
	  
Hence,	   taken literally, descriptions that ground structural claims (almost always) fail to be 
descriptions of the intended target system. Instead, they describe a hypothetical system which 
is distinct from the target system.	  This	  has	  unfortunate	  consequences	  for	  the	  structuralist.	  
If the	   descriptions employed to attribute a structure to a target system were just plain 
descriptions of	  that system, then the claim that model-systems are just structures would appear 
at least prima	   facie plausible. But once we acknowledge that these descriptions describe 
hypothetical	   systems rather than real target systems, we also have to acknowledge that 
hypothetical	  systems are an important part of the theoretical apparatus we employ, and that 
they therefore	  have to be included in our analysis of how scientific modelling works. This 
can, of course, be done in different ways. My suggestion is that these hypothetical systems in 
fact are the models-systems. I therefore I reserve the term ‘model-system’ for the hypothetical 
physical entities described by the descriptions we use to ground structural claims; I refer to 
                                                
13 This is what Downes has in mind when he says that there is no empirical system corresponding to the equation 
of the ideal pendulum (1992, 145), and what Thomson-Jones (2007) emphasises when he points out that science 
is full of ‘descriptions of missing systems’; in a different ways the same point is also made by Cartwright (1983, 
Ch. 7) who emphasises that we have to come up with a ‘prepared description’ of the system in order to make it 
amenable to mathematical treatment. 
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the relevant structures as ‘model structures’. This facilitates the analysis in what follows, but 
ultimately nothing hangs on this choice; one could just as well say that model-systems are 
composite entities consisting of a hypothetical and a structural system. What does matter, 
however, is that we acknowledge that scientific modelling indeed involves such hypothetical 
systems.14 
 
At least some proponents of structuralist conception will reject this argument.15 The bone of 
contention is what model-systems represent. So far I have assumed that a model-system 
represents a piece of the real world, for instance the solar system or a population of rabbits. 
This, so the objection goes, is the wrong point of departure since models don’t represent 
systems in this sense. What a model-system ultimately represents is a data model, not an 
object of some sort. Data are what gather in experiments. When observing the motion of the 
moon, we take choose a coordinate system and observe the position of the moon in this 
coordinate system at consecutive instants of time. We then write down these observations. 
This can be done in different ways. We can simply write a list with the coordinates of the 
moon at certain instants of time; we can draw a graph consisting of various points standing for 
the position of the moon at different times; or we can choose yet another form of taking down 
the data. The data thus gathered are called the raw data. The raw data then undergo a process 
of cleansing, rectification and regimentation: we throw away data points that are obviously 
faulty, take into consideration what the measurement errors are, take averages, etc. Often (but 
not always) the aim of this process is to fit a smooth curve through the various data points so 
that the curve satisfies certain theoretical desiderata (having minimal least-square-distance 
from the actual data points). The end result of this process is a so-called data model.  
 
                                                
14 One could try to avoid the commitment to hypothetical systems by renouncing a literal understanding of the 
relevant descriptions and arguing that it does not follow from the fact that descriptions are poor or highly 
idealised that they are not descriptions of the target at all; it just means that they are idealised descriptions. This 
move is of no avail. Being an idealised description is not a primitive concept and it calls for analysis. On the 
most plausible analysis, D is an approximate description of object O iff what D literally describes is in some 
relevant sense an idealisation of O. But what D literally describes is a hypothetical system, and so we find 
ourselves back where we started. 
15 The German structuralists explicitly acknowledge the need for a concrete description of the target-system 
(Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed 1987, 37-38). Moreover, they consider these ‘informal descriptions’ to be 
‘internal’ to the theory. Unfortunately they do not say more about this issue. Nevertheless, it is important to 
emphasise that there is no conflict between structuralism thus construed and the view developed in this chapter; 
in fact they can be seen as complementary.  
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The claim then is that model-systems do not represent parts of the world (like the earth and 
the sun), but rather data-models that have been constructed from observations made on these 
parts of the world. So what a model of the motion of planet earth is about is not the earth 
itself, but the smooth curve that we have fitted through the data gained when observing the 
motion of the earth. In this vein van Frassen declares that ‘[...] the theoretical models 
(proffered [...] as candidates for the representation of the phenomena) are confronted by the 
data models. [...] to fit those data models is ultimately the bottom line.’ (2002, 164).16 In brief, 
the suggestion is that representation be explicated in terms of setting up an isomorphism 
between the model-system (on this view a structure) and the data model. This move indeed 
renders the above argument obsolete since data models are mathematical entities and as such 
can be considered to have a well-defined structure.17  
 
This suggestion is wrong because it is descriptively inadequate: it is not the case that models 
represent data. This point is not new. It has been argued by Bogen and Woodward (1988) and 
Woodward (1989), and has recently been reiterated in different guise by Teller (2001).18 In 
essence I agree with these authors; however, my focus differs slightly from theirs and I 
present the subject matter in a way that suits my needs.  
 
In nuce, Bogen’s and Woodward’s point is that science is not about data; it is about 
phenomena. A theory about the melting point of lead is not about the data we gather when we 
find out at what temperature lead melts; it is about the melting of lead itself. This carries over 
to models: models do not represent data. In fact, most models do not per se contain anything 
that could be directly compared to data we gather; or more specifically, they do not involve 
structures that could plausibly be thought of as being isomorphic to a data model.  
 
Let me illustrate this with an example from Bogen and Woodward: the discovery of weak 
neutral currents (ibid., 315-18). What the model at stake consists of is particles: neutrinos, 
                                                
16 See also van Fraassen (1980, 64; 1989, 229; 1997, 524) and French (French 1999, 191-192). 
17 There is an exegetic question here. Although structuralists certainly suggest that representation is data 
matching, they never explicitly say so. I here explore the stronger version of the view on which representation 
indeed consists in data matching since the weaker version, on which data matching is distinct from 
representation, does not provide a viable criticism of the above argument from abstractness.  
18 McAllister (1997) presents and antirealist critique of Bogen and Woodward. But his concern is orthogonal to 
mine: even if one construes phenomena in an antirealist way they turn out to be more than just data.  
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nucleons, the Z0, and so on, along with the reactions that take place between them.19 Nothing 
of that, however, shows in the relevant data. What was produced at CERN in Geneva were 
290000 bubble chamber photographs of which roughly one hundred were considered to 
provide evidence for the existence of neutral currents. The notable point in this story is that 
there is no part of the model (which quantum field theory provides us with) that could be 
claimed to be isomorphic to these photographs (or any data model one might want to 
construct on the basis of these). It is weak neutral currents that occur in the model, but not any 
sort of data we gather in an experiment.  
 
This is not to say that these data have nothing to do with the model. The model posits a 
certain number of particles and informs us about the way in which they interact both with 
each other and with their environment. Using this we can place them in a certain experimental 
context. The data we then gather in an experiment are the product of the elements of the 
model and of the way in which they operate in a given context. Characteristically this context 
is one which we are able to control and about which we have reliable knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge about detectors, accelerators, photographic plates and so on). Using this and the 
model we can derive predictions about what the outcomes of an experiment will be. But, and 
this is the salient point, these predictions involve the entire experimental set-up and not only 
the model and there is nothing in the model itself with which one could compare the data. 
Hence, data are highly contextual and there is a gap between observable outcomes of 
experiments and anything one might call a substructure of a model of neutral currents.20 
 
                                                
19 The model I am talking about here is not the so-called standard model of elementary particles as a whole. 
Rather, what I have in mind is one specific model about the interaction of certain particles of the kind one would 
find in a theoretical paper on this experiment.  
20 To underwrite this claim consider the following example. Parallel to the research at CERN, the NAL in 
Chicago also performed an experiment to detect weak neutral currents. The data obtained in this experiment 
were quite different, however. They consisted of records of patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors. 
Though the experiments at CERN and at NAL were totally different and the data gathered had nothing in 
common, they were meant to provide evidence for the same theoretical model. But the model does not contain 
any of these contextual factors. It posits certain particles and their interaction with other particles, not how 
detectors work or what readings they show. The model is not idiosyncratic to a special experimental context in 
the way the data are, and therefore it is not surprising that the model does not contain a substructure that could 
plausibly be claimed to be isomorphic to the data. The model represents an entity – weak neutral currents – and 
not data used in its discovery. 
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But what, then, is the significance of data, if they are not the kind of things that models 
represent? The answer to this question is that data perform an evidential function. That is, data 
play the role of evidence for the presence of certain phenomena. The fact that we find a 
certain pattern in a bubble chamber photograph is evidence for the existence of neutral 
currents, and for the fact that the model is a (more or less) faithful representation of what is 
happening in the world. Thus construed, we do not denigrate the importance of data to 
science, but we do not have to require that data have to be isomorphically embeddable into the 
model at stake. 
 
In sum, understanding the fictional scenario of which the formal apparatus of a model is 
literally true is essential to understanding and using a model. Furthermore, one has to 
recognise that structures cannot be connected to anything in the world without the mediation 
of non-structural concepts, and attempts to bypass this conclusion by appeal to data models 
fails.  
 
 
4. Model-Systems and Imagination 
 
So far, I have argued that model-systems are best understood as akin to characters and objects 
of literary fiction. However, as I have indicated above, fictional entities are beset with 
philosophical problems (see Friend (2007) for a discussion of these) and hence explaining 
models in terms of fiction hardly seems to be progress. Hence the burden of proof is on the 
side of the proponent of the fiction view, who has to show that there is a workable conception 
of fiction that serves the needs of a theory of scientific modelling. Developing such a view is 
the aim of this section.21 This involves a lengthy discussion of philosophical subtleties that at 
first may seem peripheral to the concerns of scientific modelling. I appeal to the forbearance 
of the reader and promise that this effort is not in vain. For one, without a tenable conception 
of fiction, the fictions view is without foundation, and the only way to prove that it stands 
firm is to explicitly formulate a tenable account of fiction. For another, one of the results of 
this excursion into the philosophical jungles of fiction is the distinction it allows us to draw 
between two different conceptions of representation, p-representation and t-representation. 
This distinction, I think, is crucial to understanding how scientific modelling works, and a 
failure to keep the two separate has led to considerable confusion.  
                                                
21 This section and the next are based on my (2009).  
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What do we expect from an account of fiction in order for it to be able to serve as the 
foundation of the fiction view of model-systems? I think it has to provide responses to five 
questions (Q1-Q5) and to satisfy two meta-theoretical criteria (C1-C2). These questions and 
criteria are as follows: 
 
(Q1) Identity conditions. When are two model-systems identical? This question is pressing 
because unlike in the context of literature, where we can point to canonical texts and authors’ 
intentions, model-systems in science are often presented by different authors (in different 
papers or textbooks) in different ways. Nevertheless, many different descriptions are actually 
meant to describe the same model-system. Under what circumstances is that the case? That is, 
when are the model-systems specified by different descriptions identical?  
 
(Q2) Attribution of properties. In the previous section I have argued that model-systems have 
‘physical’, ‘concrete’, or ‘material’ properties. As the scare-quotes indicate, there is 
something problematic about this claim. In fact, it has even been claimed that such statements 
are outright contradictory because abstract objects like the ideal pendulum cannot have the 
same properties as concrete physical systems (Hughes 1997, 330). How is it possible for a 
model-system to have ‘material’ properties if model-systems do not exist in space and time? 
What sense can we make of statements like ‘the ball is charged’ or ‘the population is isolated 
from its environment’ if there are no balls and populations?  
 
(Q3) Comparative statements. As we have seen above, comparing a model and its target-
system is essential to many aspects of modelling, and it plays a crucial role in the account of 
representation developed below. We customarily say things like ‘real agents do not behave 
like the agents in the model’ and ‘the surface of the real sun is unlike the surface of the model 
sun’. How can we compare something that does not exist with something that does? Likewise, 
how are we to analyse statements that compare features of two model-systems with each other 
like ‘the agents in the first model are more rational than the agents in the second model’?  
 
(Q4) Truth in model-systems. There is right and wrong in a discourse about model-systems. It 
is true that the population in Fibonacci’s model never decreases and it is wrong that the earth 
in Newton’s model moves on parabolic orbit. But on what basis are claims about a model-
system qualified as true or false, in particular if the claims concern issues about which the 
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description of the system remains silent? What we need is an account of truth in model-
systems, which, first, explains what it means for a claim about a model-system to be true or 
false and which, second, draws the line between true and false statements at the right place 
(for instance, an account on which all statements about a model-systems come out false would 
be unacceptable).  
 
(Q5) Epistemology. We do investigate model-systems and find out about them; truths about 
the model-system are not forever concealed from us. In fact, we engage with model-systems 
because we want to explore their properties. How do we do this? How do we find out about 
these truths and how do we justify our claims?  
 
(C1) Naturalism. The account we offer in response to the above issues should be able to make 
sense of scientific practice. That is, it should be able to explain how scientists build models 
and how they reason about them.  
 
(C2) Metaphysical commitments. The metaphysics of fictional entities is an issue fraught with 
controversy. For this reason we need to know what kind of commitments we incur when we 
understand model-systems along the lines of fiction, and how these commitments, if any, can 
be justified. However, it is not, in my view, a condition of adequacy that the account we 
propose be metaphysically parsimonious. As a matter of fact, the account I develop below 
eschews commitment to fictional entities, but this is accidental, as it were. To say it a different 
way, it just so happens that the theory that provides the most convincing answers to the above 
questions is also metaphysically parsimonious; but if it had turned out that a metaphysically 
substantial theory (i.e. one that is committed to fictional entities) had provided the best 
answers, then we should have chosen that theory. In other words, I think that accounts of 
fictional entities should not be dismissed merely on the grounds of being metaphysically 
‘thick’. That I dismiss such accounts has to do only with their failure to answer other 
questions in a satisfactory way.22 
 
                                                
22 For want of space I cannot discuss competing approaches. In a nutshell, their problems seem to be the 
following. The paraphrase account (Russell 1905) does not offer a workable theory of truth in fiction (Crittenden 
1991, Ch. 1). The neo-Meinongean view (Parsons 1980) runs into difficulties with incompleteness (Howell 
1979, Sec. 1) and as a consequence does not offer a satisfactory answer to (I5). Finally, Lewis’ (1978) account is 
too permissive about what counts as true in a fictional context (Currie 1990, Sec. 2.3; Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 
Ch. 4). 
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That said, it is the contention of this chapter that Kendall Walton’s (1990) pretence theory of 
fiction best fits this bill.23 The next section provides a brief introduction to this theory, and 
Section 5 outlines the responses that we get from this theory to (Q1) – (Q5) and (C1)-(C2). 
The point of departure of this view is the capacity of humans to imagine things.24 Sometimes 
we imagine something without a particular reason. But there are cases in which our imagining 
something is prompted by the presence of a particular object, in which case this object is 
referred to as a ‘prop’. ‘Object’ has to be understood in the widest sense possible; anything 
capable of affecting our senses can serve as a prop. An object becomes a prop due to the 
imposition of a rule or ‘principle of generation’ (p. 38), prescribing what is to be imagined as 
a function of the presence of the object. If someone imagines something because he is 
encouraged to do so by the presence of a prop he is engaged in a game of make-believe. 
Someone who is involved in a game of make-believe is pretending; so ‘pretence’ is just a 
shorthand way of describing participation in such a game (p. 391) and has (in this context) 
nothing to do with deception (p. 392). The simplest examples of games of make-believe are 
cases of child's play (p. 11). In one such case, stumps may be regarded as bears and a rope put 
around the stump may mean that the bear has been lassoed; or pointing the index finger at 
someone and saying ‘bang’ may mean that the person has been shot.  
 
A prop becomes a prompter if some notices the prop and as a result starts engaging in a rule-
guided imaginative activity. The set of prompters and the set of props overlap, but neither is a 
subset of the other. For one, a prop that is never perceived by anybody and hence never causes 
anybody to imagine something is not a prompter (but still a prop). For another, an object can 
prompt imaginations without being part of a game of make-believe (i.e. in the absence of rules 
of generation), for instance when we see faces in the clouds and imagine how these faces talk 
to each other. Even within a game we can make errors (e.g. mistakenly take a mole heap for a 
stump and then say that it is a bear), in which case the mole heap is a prompter (because it 
prompts imaginings) but it is not a prop (because there is not a rule).   
 
                                                
23 Strictly speaking, Walton (1990) restricts the use of ‘pretence’ to verbal (or more generally behavioural) 
participation, which does not include the activity of someone reading on his own. However, it has become 
customary to use ‘pretence’ as synonymous with ‘make-believe’ and I stick to this wider use in what follows. 
24 I here discuss pretence theory as it is presented by Walton (1990); Currie (1990) and Evans (1982, Ch. 10) 
develop different versions. Parenthetical references in the text of this and the following section are to Walton’s 
book.  
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Pretence theory considers a vast variety of different props ranging from novels to movies, 
from paintings to plays, and from music to children’s games. In the present context I only 
discuss the case of literature. Works of literary fiction are, on the current account, regarded as 
props as they prompt the reader to imagine certain things. By doing so a fiction generates its 
own game of make-believe. This game can be played by a single player when reading the 
work, or by a group when someone tells the story to the others.  
 
Some rules of generation are ad hoc, for instance when a group of children spontaneously 
imposes the rule that stumps are bears and play the game ‘catch the bear’. Other rules are 
publicly agreed on and hence (at least relatively) stable. Games based on public rules are 
‘authorized’; games involving ad hoc rules are ‘unauthorized’.  
 
By definition, a prop is a representation if it is a prop in an authorised game. On this view, 
then, stumps are not representations of bears because the rule to regard stumps as bears is an 
ad hoc rule that is neither shared by others in the society nor stable over time (stumps may not 
be props to other people and even the children playing the game now may regarded them as 
elephants on the next walk). However, Hamlet is a representation because everybody who 
understands English is invited to imagine its content, and this has been so since the work 
came into existence. Within pretence theory ‘representation’ is used as a technical term. 
Representations are not, as is customary, explained in terms of their relation (e.g. resemblance 
or denotation) to something beyond themselves; representations are things that possess the 
social function of serving as props in authorised games of make-believe (I will come back to 
this point below).  
 
Props generate fictional truths by virtue of their features and principles of generation. 
Fictional truths can be generated directly or indirectly; directly generated truths are ‘primary’ 
and indirectly generated truths are ‘implied’ (p. 140). Derivatively, one can call the principles 
of generation responsible for the generation of primary truths ‘principles of direct generation’ 
and those responsible for implied truths ‘principles of indirect generation’. The leading idea is 
that primary truths follow immediately from the prop, while implied ones result from the 
application of some rules of inference. When little Jimmy sees a stump and shouts ‘here is a 
bear’ this is a direct truth because it follows from fact that there is a stump and the direct rule 
‘stumps are bears’, which is constitutive of the game. The boys may then stay away from the 
bear because they think the bear is dangerous and might hurt them. This fictional truth is 
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inferred because it does not follow from the basic laws of the game that stumps are bears, but 
from the additional principle that bears in the game have the same properties as real bears.  
 
The distinction between primary and inferred truths is also operative in literary fiction. The 
reader of Changing Places reads that Zapp ‘embarked […] on an ambitious critical project: a 
series of commentaries on Jane Austen which would work through the whole canon, one 
novel at a time, saying absolutely everything that could possibly be said about them.’ The 
reader is thereby invited to imagine the direct truth that Morris Zapp is working on such a 
project. She is also invited to imagine that Zapp is overconfident, arrogant in an amusing way, 
and pursues a project that is impossible to complete. None of this is explicitly stated in the 
novel. These are inferred truths, which the reader deduces from common knowledge about 
academic projects and the psyche of people pursuing them.25 What rules can legitimately be 
used to reach conclusions of this sort is a difficult issue fraught with controversy. I will return 
briefly to it below; for the time being all that matters is that there are such rules, no matter 
what they are.  
 
This framework, has the resources to explain the nature of model-systems. Typically, model-
systems are presented to us by way of descriptions, and these descriptions should be 
understood as props in games of make-believe., These descriptions usually begin with 
expressions like ‘consider’ or ‘assume’ and thereby make it clear that they are not 
descriptions of fact, but an invitation to ponder – in the present idiom, imagine – a particular 
situation. Although it is often understood that this situation is such that it does not occur 
anywhere in reality, this is not a prerequisite; models, like literary fictions, are not defined in 
contrast to truth. In elementary particle physics, for instance, a scenario is often proposed 
simply as a suggestion worth considering. Only later, when all the details are worked out, the 
question is asked whether this scenario bears an interesting relation to what happens in nature, 
and if so what the relation is.26 
 
                                                
25 The distinction between primary and inferred truths is not always easy to draw, in particular when dealing with 
complex literary fiction. Walton also guards against simply associating primary truth with what is explicitly 
stated in the text and inferred ones with what follows from them (see Walton (1990, Ch. 4) for a discussion). For 
the purpose of the present discussion these subtleties are inconsequential.  
26 For an accessible account of particle physics that makes this aspect explicit see Smolin (2007), in particular 
Ch. 5 
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The ‘working out’ of the details usually consists in deriving conclusions from the primary 
assumptions of the model and some general principles or laws that are taken for granted. For 
instance, we derive that the earth moves in an elliptical orbit from the basic assumptions of 
the Newtonian model and the laws of classical mechanics. This is explained naturally in the 
idiom of pretence theory. What is explicitly stated in a model description (that the model-
earth is spherical, etc.) are the primary truths of the model, and what follows from them via 
laws or general principles are the implied truths; the principles of direct generation are the 
linguistic conventions that allow us to understand the relevant description, and the principles 
of indirect generation are the laws that are used to derive further results from the primary 
truths.  
 
We can now address the above questions. The attribution of certain concrete properties to 
models (Q2) is explained as it being fictional that the model-system possesses these 
properties. To say that the model-population is isolated from its environment is just like 
saying that Zapp drives a convertible. Both claims follow from a prop together with rules of 
generation. In other words, saying that a hypothetical entity possesses certain properties 
involves nothing over and above saying that within a certain game of make-believe we are 
entitled to imagine the entity as having these properties. For this reason there is nothing 
mysterious about ascribing concrete properties to nonexistent things, nor is it a category 
mistake to do so.  
 
Let us now discuss the issue of truth in model-systems (Q4), which will also provide us with 
solutions to the other open questions. The question is: what exactly do we assert when we 
qualify ‘Zapp drives a convertible’ as true in the fiction while ‘Zapp drives a Mini Cooper’ as 
false?27 To begin with, it is crucial to realise that there are three different kinds of statement in 
connection with fiction, and that these require a different treatment when it comes to the 
questions of truth; I refer to these as intrafictional, metafictional, and transfictional 
statements.28 For someone sitting in an armchair reading Changing Places ‘Morris jumped 
into the paternoster on the downside’ is an intrafictional statement because the reader is 
                                                
27 There is controversy over this issue even within pretence theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
the different proposals and compare them to one another. In what follows I develop an account of truth in fiction 
that is based on elements from different theories and that is tailored towards the needs of a theory of model-
systems. 
28 All theories of fiction acknowledge this distinction. My terminology is adapted from Currie (1990, Ch. 4) who 
speaks about the ‘fictive’, ‘metafictive’ and ‘transfictive’ use of fictional names.  
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involved in playing the game defined by the novel and imagines that the sentence’s content is 
the case. Someone who read the novel a while ago and asserts in discussion with a friend that 
Zapp jumped into a paternoster makes a metafictional statement because he is talking about 
the fiction. If he then also asserts that Zapp, his quirks notwithstanding, is more likeable than 
any literature teacher he ever had or that Zapp is smarter than Candide, he makes 
transfictional statements as he is comparing Zapp to a real person and a character in another 
fiction.29 
 
Intraficational propositions are made within the fiction and we are not meant to believe them, 
nor are we meant to take them as reports of fact; we are meant to imagine them. Although 
some statements are true in the fiction as well as true tout court (‘1968 was the year of student 
revolts’ is true and true in Changing Places), we often qualify false statements as true in the 
fiction (‘Zapp is a literary theorist’ is false because there is no Zapp) and true statements as 
false in the fiction (‘white light is composed of light of other colours’ is false in Goethe’s 
Faust). So truth and truth in fiction are distinct; in fact, truth in fiction is not a species of truth 
at all (p. 41). For this reason it has become customary when talking about what is the case in a 
fiction to replace locutions like ‘true in the fiction’ or ‘true in a fictional world’ by the term of 
art ‘being fictional’; henceforth ‘Fw(p)’ is used as an abbreviation for ‘it is fictional in work w 
that p’, where p is a placeholder for an intrafictional proposition like ‘Zapp pursues an 
impossible project’.30  
 
The question now becomes: when is p fictional in w? Let the w-game of make-believe be the 
game of make-believe based on work w, and similarly for ‘w-prop’ and ‘w-principles of 
generation’. Then, p is fictional in w iff p is to be imagined in the w-game of make-believe (p. 
39). In more detail:  
 
                                                
29 Notice that while transfictional statements are recognisable by the presence of terms that are foreign to the 
work under discussion, intrafictional and metafictional statements are recognisable as such only as a function of 
the context in which they appear. There are also statements that are difficult to classify. As these typically 
involve emotional reactions on the part of the reader to the novel (halfway through the book a reader exclaims ‘I 
fear the worst for Zapp’), they need not occupy us here. 
30 I here follow Currie (1990, Ch. 2) and assume that sentences like ‘Zapp drives a convertible’ express 
propositions, something that Walton denies (p. 391). This assumption greatly simplifies the statement of truth 
conditions for fictional statements, but nothing in the present paper hangs on it. Essentially the same results can 
be reached only using sentences and pretence (see pp. 400-405).  
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p is fictional in work w iff the w-prop together with the w-principles of generation 
prescribes p to be imagined 
 
This analysis alleviates worries about the (alleged) subjectivity of imaginings. In common 
parlance, ‘imagination’ has subjective overtones, which might suggest that an understanding 
of models as imagined entities makes them subjective because every person imagines 
something different. This is not so. In pretence theory, imaginations in an authorised game of 
make-believe are sanctioned by the prop itself and the rules of generation, both of which are 
public and shared by the relevant community. Therefore, someone’s imaginings are governed 
by intersubjective rules, which guarantee that, as long as the rules are respected, everybody 
involved in the game has the same imaginings. So, not only do all participants in the game de 
facto imagine the same things (which could also be the result of happenstance), but they do so 
because they participate in a rule-governed activity. What is more, participants know that they 
do; they know that they are participants in an authorised game and as long as they trust that 
the others play by the rules they can trust that other have the same imaginings.  
 
Furthermore, for a proposition to be fictional in work w it is not necessary that it is actually 
imagined by anyone: fictional propositions are ones for which there is a prescription to the 
effect that they have to be imagined (p. 39), and whether a proposition is to be imagined is 
determined by the prop and the rules of generation. Hence, props, via the rules of generation, 
make propositions fictional independently of people’s actual imaginings (p. 38), and for this 
reason there can be fictional truths that no one knows of. If there is a stump hidden behind a 
bush, unknown to those playing the game, it is still fictional that there is a bear behind the 
bush; the prop itself and the rules of generation are sufficient to generate this fictional truth. 
 
With this in place we can now also render concept of a ‘fictional world’ or ‘world of a fiction’ 
precise: the world of work w is the set of all propositions that are fictional in w.31 
 
This analysis of truth in fiction carries over to model-systems one to one simply by replacing 
p by a claim about the model, w by the description of the model-system, and w-principles of 
generation by the laws and principles assumed be at work in the model. For instance, ‘the 
                                                
31 Fictional worlds thus defined are rather different from possible worlds as used in modal logic, the most 
significant difference being that the former are incomplete while the latter are not. See Currie (1990, 53-70) for a 
discussion of possible worlds and fiction.  
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solar system is stable’ is true in the Newtonian model of the solar system systems iff the 
description of the system together with the laws and principles assumed to hold in the system 
(the laws of classical mechanics, the law of gravity, and some general assumptions about 
physical objects) imply that this is the case. This gives us a straightforward answer to the 
question about identity conditions (Q1): two models are identical iff the worlds of the two 
models – the set of all propositions that are fictional in the two models – are identical.32 
 
Metafictional propositions make genuine claims that can be true or false in the same way in 
which claims about chairs and tables can be true or false. But how can such statements be true 
if the singular terms that occur in them have no referents? A solution emerges when we 
realise that statements like ‘Zapp is a professor’ are ellipses for ‘in Changing Places, Zapp is 
a professor’. So when we metafictionally assert p, what we really assert is ‘in work w, p’ (p. 
397). Asserting that something is the case in a work of fiction is tantamount to asserting that it 
is fictional in that work. Hence asserting ‘in work w, p’ amounts to asserting ‘p is fictional in 
work w’, which in turn in is equivalent to ‘it is fictional in work w that p’. The last sentence is, 
of course, just Fw(p). Hence metafictionally asserting p amounts to asserting Fw(p). The truth 
condition for this assertion follows from what has been said above:  
 
Fw(p) is true iff p is fictional in w, which in turn is the case iff the w-prop and together 
with the w-principles of generation prescribes p to be imagined.  
 
Derivatively, p, when uttered as a metafictional claim, is true iff p is fictional when uttered as 
an intrafictional claim.33 In sum, once we understand that a metafictional claim has to be 
prefixed by ‘In fiction w’, and hence has the structure Fw(p), the truth of the claim is 
determined by appeal to the w-game of make-believe. Again, this analysis translates to 
scientific statements without further ado.  
 
Transfictional propositions pose a particular problem because they – apparently – involve 
comparisons with a nonexistent objects, which does not seem to make sense: we cannot 
                                                
32 An interesting consequence of this identity condition is that not all models with the same prop are identical, 
because they can operate with different rules of indirect generation. This is the case, for instance, when the ‘same 
model’ is treated first classically and then quantum mechanically; on the current view, the classical and the 
quantum model are not identical. 
33 In some places Walton ties the truth of such statements to authorised games (e.g., p. 397-8). This restriction 
seems unnecessary as the analysis works just as well for unauthorized games.  
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compare someone with Zapp if there is no Zapp. Different authors have offered very different 
solutions to this problem.34 Fortunately we need not deal with the problem of transfictional 
statements in its full generality because the transfictional statements that are relevant in 
connection with model-systems are of a particular kind: they compare features of the model-
systems with features of the target-system. For this reason, transfictional statements about 
model-systems should be read as prefixed with a clause stating what the relevant respects of 
the comparison are. This allows us to rephrase comparative sentences as comparisons between 
properties rather than objects, which makes the original puzzle go away.  
 
Crucially, then, truth conditions for transfictional statements in the context of scientific 
modelling come down to truth conditions for comparative statements between properties, 
which are unproblematic in the current context (for the problems that attach to them have 
nothing to do with issues surrounding fictional discourse). For instance, when I say ‘my friend 
James is just like Zapp’ I am not comparing my friend to a nonexistent person. What I am 
asserting is that both James and Zapp possess certain relevant properties (Zapp possesses 
properties in the sense explained above) and that these properties are similar in relevant ways. 
Likewise, when I say that the population of rabbits in a certain ecosystem behaves very much 
like the population in the Fibonacci model, what I assert is that these populations possess 
certain relevant properties which are similar in relevant respects. What these relevant 
properties are and what counts as being similar in relevant respects may well depend on the 
context. But this is not a problem. All that matters from a semantic point of view is that the 
apparent comparison with a nonexistent object eventually comes down to the unproblematic 
comparison of properties. Further, the statement making this comparison is true iff the 
statement comparing the properties with each other is true. Obviously, statements comparing 
two nonexistent objects are analysed in exactly the same way.  
 
These insights provide us with answers to (Q3) and (Q4). And what is more, this take on truth 
also provides us with an answer to the question about the epistemology of models (Q5): we 
investigate a model by finding out what follows from the primary truths of the model and the 
rules of indirect generation. This seems to be both plausible and in line with scientific practice 
                                                
34 Lamarque and Olsen (1994, Ch. 4), for instance, solve the problem by introducing characters. Walton, by 
contrast, renounces the commitment to characters and instead analyses transfictional statements in terms of 
unauthorized games (pp. 405-416). 
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because a good deal of the work that scientists do with models can accurately be described as 
studying consequences of the basic assumptions of the model – so can tick off (C1) as well.  
 
What metaphysical commitments do we incur by understanding models in this way? The 
answer is: none. Walton’s theory is antirealist in that it renounces the postulation of fictional 
or abstract entities, and hence a theory of scientific modelling based on this account is also 
free of ontological commitments. This, of course, is not a refutation of metaphysically less 
parsimonious views such as Meinong’s, and there may be reasons to eventually prefer such a 
view over an antirealist one. The point to emphasise here is that whatever these reasons may 
be, the needs of science are not one among them.  
 
This concludes the discussion of the conditions of adequacy of the last section, and I hope to 
have made it plausible that the framework of pretence theory provides convincing responses 
to the issues that arise in connection with model-systems.  
 
With this in place, we can now distinguish two different kinds of representation, which will be 
important in understanding scientific representation. As mentioned above, pretence theory 
defines a representation to be a prop in an authorised game of make-believe. On this view, the 
text of a novel and the description of a model-system are representations. Derivatively one 
can then say that props represent the imaginings they prescribe. Although this is a common 
use of ‘representation’, the term is used rather differently in both science and philosophy of 
science where it is taken to denote a relation between the model-system and its target (and, 
depending on one’s views about representation, also other relata such as users and their 
intentions). But far from being in conflict with each other, these two notions of representation 
are actually complementary – I will turn to this point in the next section. For now it is just 
important not to get them mixed up, and for this reason I call the former ‘p-representation’ 
(‘p’ for ‘prop’) and the latter ‘t-representation’ (‘t’ for target).35 Using this idiom, pretence 
theory (as presented in this section) can be understood as an analysis of p-representation. This 
leaves pending an analysis of t-representation, to which I turn in Section 6 below. I defer this 
                                                
35 A more intuitive choice of terminology would be to refer the term ‘representation’ for what I here call t-
representation, and refer to p-representation as ‘presentation’. However, since this would stand in conflict with 
the use of ‘representation’ in pretence theory I stick to the somewhat less elegant terminology of p- and t-
representation.  
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task because I first want to summarise where we stand and formulate a consistent overall 
picture of scientific modelling, which is the aim of Section 5.  
 
 
5. The Anatomy of Scientific Modelling  
 
We have analysed model-systems in terms of imagined objects and distinguished two 
different representational relations, p-representation (which holds between a prop and the 
imaginings that it mandates) and t-representation (which holds between a thus imagined 
system and a target-system in the world). Using these notions, the two acts mentioned in the 
introduction can be described as, first, introducing a p-representation specifying an imagined 
object and, second, claiming that this imagined object t-represents the relevant target-system.  
 
Putting all this together we obtain a general picture of scientific modelling. This picture is 
schematically illustrated in Figure 1.  
  
 
Figure 1 – The elements of scientific modelling. 
 
Model-System Target-System 
Model-Description: 
text serving as a prop 
T-Representation Model-Structure 
Model-Equation 
(or other formal 
descriptions) 
P-Representation 
Describes 
 
Application 
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The boxes in the middle and on the right emerge from the above discussion and don’t need 
further explanation. Not so the boxes on the left. These account for the use of mathematics. 
How mathematics applies to something non-mathematical is a time-honoured philosophical 
puzzle, and much has been written about it. However, since this is somewhat peripheral to the 
concerns of this chapter, I will not discuss this issue further and merely put the relevant boxes 
into the diagram for the sake of completeness. A discussion of the issue of the applicability of 
mathematics can be found in Shapiro (2000).  
 
Let me then add some points about this diagram by way of clarification and explanation. First, 
there is a temptation to respond to this suggestion by saying: ‘yes, fine, but where in this 
scheme is the model?’ There is no single answer to this question. With the exception of the 
target-system itself, every part of the above schema (and every combination of parts!) 
legitimately may be, and sometimes is, referred to as ‘model’, which is why I tried to avoid 
the term altogether. Once it is acknowledged that scientific modelling involves all the above 
elements, the determination of which one of these we call ‘the model’ is inconsequential. As 
long as one is aware of this we can choose terminology as we please. 
 
Second, this picture of scientific modelling is independent of how one understands the 
relation between models and theories. The model-structure in this diagram is assumed to be a 
structure used in the treatment of a particular concrete system, and not a general structure. It 
is, for instance, the structure of the harmonic oscillator, the two-body system, or a conical 
spinning top on a frictionless plane; it is not Newtonian Mechanics, Quantum Mechanics. 
Fluid Mechanics, or General Relativity (in a structural rendition). This leaves open the 
question of how these specific structures relate to overarching theories. In particular, this 
picture is compatible with the semantic view of theories that would take the model-structure 
to belong to a family of structures which forms a theory (van Fraassen 1980). This view 
agrees also with the German structuralist picture that construes model-structures as being the 
result of a process of specification and restriction of a general theory (Balzer, Moulines, and 
Sneed 1987), and a view that denies that there is any straightforward connect between models 
and theories (Morgan and Morrison 1999).  
 
Third, this diagram has no temporal connotations and there is no view implicit in it about 
what comes first in the process of the construction of a model. Sometimes we start with a 
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fictional scenario; sometimes we start with an equation we think might be useful; sometimes 
we have a clear strategy for t-representation in mind right from the start, and sometimes we 
just ‘try out’ something and worry later about how the model relates to the world. It is not 
even assumed that all parts of the diagram are belaboured by the same scientist. In particular 
when it comes to large and complex models (such as climate models), different groups may 
take care of different parts of the model (e.g. one group may develops mathematical tools and 
another one takes care of their application to the concrete problem at hand). In brief, this 
picture of modelling is compatible with any view one wants to take on the actual process of 
model construction and the division of labour therein.  
 
Fourth, there is a time-honoured problem about how it is possible that we can represent 
something that does not exist. How can we represent Santa Claus if there is no Santa Claus? 
More pertinently, how can we have models representing in great detail mechanical properties 
of the ether if there is no ether? Thinking about modelling in the way I have proposed makes 
this problem go away at once, since it becomes clear that equivocating on ‘representation’ is 
the root of the puzzle. On the one hand, we take representation to be a relation between a 
picture or model and an item in the real world (which does not exist). On the other hand, it 
assumes representation to be the infliction of mental content in an observer when she looks at 
a picture or reads the description of a model (which is, of course, real). This is exactly the 
distinction between t-representation and p-representation. Santa Clause pictures and ether 
models do not t-represent because there is no Santa Claus and no ether. But Santa Claus 
pictures p-represent in that they become props in a game of make believe leading us to 
imagine all kind of things about a bearded old man in a red outfit bringing gifts, and a 
description (or graphical representation) of an ether model leads us to imagine a fictional 
model-system. Once we recognise the distinction between p-representation and t-
representation, the problem evaporates.36  
                                                
36 Model-systems without targets (and hence without t-representation) not only play a role when explaining 
failures; they are also important as means to explore certain technical tools, in which case they are often referred 
to as ‘probing models’, ‘developmental models’, ‘study models’, ‘toy models’, or ‘heuristic models’. The 
purpose of such model-systems is not to represent anything in nature; instead they are used to test and study 
theoretical tools that are later used to build representational models. In field theory, for instance, the so-called φ4-
model has been studied extensively, but not because it represents anything in the world (it was well known right 
from the beginning that it does not), but because its simplicity allows physicist to study complicated techniques 
such as renormalization in a simple setting and get acquainted with mechanisms – in this case symmetry 
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Fifth, t-representation is not the only element in the above scheme whose absence is as 
interesting as its presence; structures and equations may similarly be construed. Although 
formalisations play an important role in modelling, not all scientific reasoning is tied to a 
formal apparatus. In fact, sometimes conclusions are established by solely considering a 
fictional scenario and without using formal tools at all. If this happens it is common to speak 
of a thought experiment. Although there does not seem to be a clear distinction between 
modelling and thought-experimenting in scientific practice, there has been little interaction 
between the respective philosophical debates.37 This is lamentable because it seems to be 
important to understand how models and thought experiments relate to each other. In a recent 
paper Davies (2007) argues that there are important parallels between fictional narratives and 
thought experiments, and that exploring these parallels sheds light on many aspects of thought 
experiments. This take on thought experiments is congenial to the view on models presented 
in this paper and suggests that modelling and thought-experimenting are intrinsically related: 
thought experiments (at least in the sciences) are models without the formal apparatus.38  
 
Sixth, although Walton's general idea of rules of generation is intuitively clear, it turns out to 
be difficult to give an account of these rules. The two most important rules in the context of 
literary fiction – the reality principle and the mutual belief principle – suffer from intrinsic 
                                                                                                                                                   
breaking – which are important in other contexts (Hartmann 1995). It is advantage of the proposed view of 
modelling that it can account for this practice without problem.  
37 Extensive discussions of Thought experiments can be found in Brown (1991), Sorensen (1992), and Brown’s 
and Norton’s contributions on this topic to Hitchcock (2004).   
38 As an example consider Galileo’s law of equal heights (Sorensen 1992, 8-9). Take a u-shaped cavity, put a ball 
on the edge on side, and let the ball roll down into the cavity. Galileo then argued that it would have to reach the 
same height at the other side – this is the law of equal heights. Of course Galileo realised that the ball’s track was 
not perfectly smooth and that the ball faced air resistance, which is why the ball in an actual experiment does not 
reach equal height on the other side. So Galileo considered an idealised situation in which there are neither 
friction nor air resistance and argued that the law was valid in that scenario. This thought experiment fits the 
above account of model-systems: Galileo considered was a fictional scenario specified by a simple description, 
yet the conclusion he wanted to reach was not part of that description and was reached by using certain general 
principles that he took to be valid in situations like the one considered. Moreover, had Galileo used a 
mathematical machinery to derive his conclusion instead of informal arguments, physicists would refer to the 
product of his endeavour as a model. One would write down a curve specifying the shape of the cavity (for 
instance a parabola), specify its mechanical properties (frictionlessness), use mechanical laws to calculate the 
trajectory of the ball, and then find that it ends up at equal height on the other side. This is the sort of thing we 
find in mechanics textbooks, and which are referred to as mechanical models of a situation.  
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problems.39 Worse, they may also lead to wrong results when put to work in science. So what 
are the rules of generation in scientific fictions? This is a substantial question that needs to be 
addressed, but we should not expect a single unified answer. On the contrary, it seems 
plausible to assume that different disciplines have different rules, and understanding what 
these rules are will shed light on how modelling in these disciplines works. So we should not 
expect a ready-made answer, but rather regard the study of rules of generation as part of 
research programme aiming at understanding the practice of modelling in various branches of 
science.  
 
Seventh, not all models are introduced by verbal descriptions; sometimes we use drawings, 
sketches or diagrams to specify the model-system. There are linguistic and non-linguistic 
props. Although I have discussed pretence theory only in as far as it deals with linguistic 
props, the scope of the theory is much wider than that. In fact it covers all kinds of props, 
among them the classical media of visual art (paintings, drawings, etchings, etc.), as well as 
photography and film. So the current framework is equipped to deal with p-representation that 
is nonverbal.  
 
Eighth, the fact the view of modelling advanced here is developed by drawing analogies with 
literary fiction should not be taken to suggest that there are no differences between the two. 
An in-depth comparison between literature and scientific modelling is beyond the scope of 
this essay, but some salient differences are readily stated. Literary plots are often complex and 
convoluted, while fictional scenarios canvassed in science are extremely simple and it seldom 
takes more than a few lines to describe the set-up. One of the reasons for this is that they must 
allow for mathematical treatment. Fictional scenarios in science are also often created with a 
specific target-system in mind, and the scenario is chosen such that t-representation can be set 
up – considerations that play only a marginal, if any, role in literature. Aesthetic 
considerations (style, genre, etc.) are irrelevant for model-descriptions, and so are emotional 
reactions of the reader to the plot. Finally, authorship is irrelevant in science: we often name 
models after their progenitors (e.g. the ‘Bohr model’), but this is merely a sociological fact 
                                                
39 Roughly, the Reality Principle says that if p1 … pn are direct fictional truths, then proposition q is an indirect 
fictional truth iff: were it the case that p1 … pn, then it would be the case that q. The Mutual Belief Principle says 
that that if p1 … pn are direct fictional truths, then proposition q is a indirect fictional truth iff: it is mutually 
believed in the artist’s society that were it the case that p1 … pn, it would be the case that q. See Walton (1990, 
Ch. 4) for a discussion of these principles.  
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with no systematic import since ambiguities and open questions are not resolved by appeal to 
the author’s intention or context.  
 
Ninth, needless to say, pretence theory is not without internal problems.40 Although Walton's 
account eschews common-sense understandings of imagination (as noted above), more needs 
to be said about what exactly imagining amounts to in science and about how it differs from 
imagining in other contexts, as well as how it differs from other activities like considering, 
pondering, and entertaining. However, I will have to leave this issue for another occasion.  
 
 
6. A First Stab at T-Representation 
 
So far I have argued that models are imagined objects and I have shown how this leads to a 
coherent overall view of scientific modelling (shown in Figure 1). In particular, I have 
presented an account of what it means for claims about a model-system to be true, how we 
learn about model-systems, and how we can meaningfully compare them to either things in 
the world or other model systems. What is still missing from the analysis is an account of how 
model-systems represent (i.e. t-represent) something beyond themselves. The structuralist 
answer (that representation essentially is isomorphism) is not available to the fiction view 
since only structures can enter into isomorphisms and model-systems, on this view, are not 
structures. So we have to go back to the drawing board and develop a new account of 
representation that can explain how a model-system of the kind introduced in Section 4 can 
represent a target system. This is project for this section.  
 
The first question is what to choose as our source from which we might formulate an account 
of t-representation. So far I have developed an account of scientific modelling by drawing 
analogies with literary fiction. Unfortunately this analogy does not seem to be productive 
when it comes to t-representation. Understanding t-representation involves establishing and 
understanding a relation between the fictional scenario and parts (or aspects) of the real world. 
While we sometimes do this casually (for instance when I compare my friend James with 
Zapp), there is controversy over whether this is in any way essential to our engagement with 
                                                
40 For critical discussion see, among others, Lamarque (1991), Budd (1992), and the contributions to the 
symposium on Walton’s book in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991). See Currie (2004) for a 
discussion of difference notions of imagination.  
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fiction, and whether it leads to any interesting insights. Elgin (1996, Ch. 6) argues it does, 
which is what Kivy (2006, Chs. 24-28) denies. But even if this controversy could be resolved 
in favour of those who believe in the cognitive value of literature, there is no general and 
unambiguous method of bringing to bear literary fictions on real-world situations, which 
could serve as the blue-print for t-representation in science.41  
 
The analogy I wish to exploit in what follows is the one between maps and scientific 
representations. This analogy is of course not new; see Sismondo and Chrisman (2001) for a 
survey and discussion. But I want to put the analogy to a slightly different use than other 
writers. While the map analogy has in the past mainly been employed to defend some sort of 
scientific realism, I wish to remain non-committal about realism and use maps only to explain 
how representation works at a the most general level.42, 43 
 
The essence of a map is that it allows us to ‘read off’ properties of the territory from the map: 
by looking at a map of London we see that Camden lies west of Hackney, Brixton is south of 
the river, etc. The map is different from a verbal description in that it does not merely state 
these facts; maps are not long lists with sentences describing a certain area. Facts about the 
city are inferred from facts about the map itself and a ‘key of translation’, which says how 
facts about the map translate into facts about the city. This is realisation provides us with the 
elements of the general scheme of representation:  
 
X t-represents Y iff:  
                                                
41 Elgin’s account is based on the notion of exemplification. This account is on the right track, and worked out 
version of the account I propose below will draw on many of its insights. However, at least in its basic form, this 
account does not cover cases in which the representational vehicle and the target do not share the relevant 
properties. The account suggested below is more permissive in that respect.  
42 Throughout this chapter I use a realistic idiom in the sense that I assume that what is represented, the target 
system, exists. This is for the ease of formulation and my position could be restated from the point of view of 
metaphysical antirealism. What I want to remain non-committal about is scientific realism, roughly the position 
that theories are more or less truthful mirror images of reality. At a general level representing something does not 
amount to giving a mirror image, or to make a copy of that item. A representation can be alike to its target, but it 
does not have to be. There is nothing in the notion of a representation that ties it to imitation or copying. A 
general account of representation has to make room for non-realistic representations in this sense.  
43 Maps are of course real and not fictional objects. It will become clear as we proceed that representation works 
in the same way for fictional and real objects. Hence that maps, unlike model-systems, are material objects is no 
impediment to using them in the current context.  
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(R1)  X denotes Y. 
(R2)  X comes with a key K specifying how facts about X are to be translated into 
claims about Y.  
 
In nutshell, the idea is that the first condition establishes the aboutness of X, and the second 
guarantees the cognitive relevance of X for Y.44 Before qualifying these conditions, let me 
illustrate them in more detail.45 I have in front of me a map of North London. This is the first 
condition: the map denotes North London. Now I look at the details. I see a black rectangle on 
a black line and written next to it is ‘Camden Road’. The explanations that come with the map 
say that this rectangle stands for an over-ground railway station, the name next to it is the 
name of the station, and the black line stands for the rail tracks. A bit further up there is a 
black dot on a black line. The legend say that the dot stands for a tube station, and the name 
written next to it is the name of the station, in this case ‘Kentish Town’. Between the two 
there is a by thick yellow line, which stand for a main road. Hence, that a black rectangle 
labelled ‘Camden Road’ is connected with a thick yellow line to a black dot labelled ‘Kentish 
Town’ (a fact in the map) translates into the fact that Camden Road railway station is 
connected to Kentish Town tube station by a main road (a fact about North London). 
Furthermore, from the fact that this yellow line is 4.5cm long, I can infer that the actual 
distance between the two is about 1km since the scale of the map is 4.55cm to 1km. Finally, 
the ‘Kentish Town’ dot lies vertically above the ‘Camden Road’ rectangle, from which I infer 
that Kentish Town tube station is north of Camden Road railway station.  
 
Our use of a map essentially involves a key, telling us how to translate facts about the map 
into facts about North London. Some elements of the key are stated at the bottom of the map; 
for instance, we are instructed that rectangles stand for railway stations and dots for tube 
stations. Other elements are conventions that are so common that they are assumed without 
further explanation. The top of the map indicates north, for example, and the distances in the 
map are proportional to distances in the world (where the ‘scale’ of the map gives the 
proportionality factor). But these are mere conventions and there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘self 
                                                
44 The first condition is Goodman’s (1976, Ch. 1) who has argued that denotation lies at the heart of 
representation.  
45 Common alternatives to the current proposal are isomorphism and similarity accounts of representation; see 
Frigg (2006) and Suárez (2003) for discussions. Other alternatives have been proposed by Contessa (2007), 
Hughes (1997), Suárez (2004; 2006) and Toon (2009). For want of space I cannot discuss these here.  
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evident’ or even ‘necessary’ about them. We could use rectangles to denote tube stations 
rather than railway stations. We could draw the map so the south rather than north is on top, 
and have projection techniques that do not preserve distances.46 The crucial point, though, is 
that what a map represents depends not only on facts in the map, but on the key that is used to 
translate these facts into claims about the world. And this key does not simply ‘jump off the 
page’; they are not ‘in’ the map itself. Instead, one has to know what the key is, and 
boundary-drawing diplomats had better take a class in map reading before attending 
international summits.  
 
My claim is that model-systems are t-representations in the same way in which maps are: they 
denote a target system and certain facts obtain in them (in the sense explained in Sections 4 
and 5) which are then translated into claims about a target system by using a key. As an 
example, consider the Bohr model of the hydrogen atom. On the current analysis this model 
consists of a model-system, which is specified by a model description and which is described 
by a formal apparatus (classical mechanics plus the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantisation rule). A 
number of facts obtain in the model-system, among them that it has discrete energy levels. We 
then take the model-system to denote real hydrogen atoms, and then use a simple key – here 
identity (more about this below) – to translate this fact into the claim that hydrogen itself has 
discrete energy levels.  
 
Let me now add three qualifications. First, (R1) and (R2) provide the general form of an 
account of t-representation, which needs to be concretised in every particular instance of a t-
representation. In fact, ‘denotation’ and ‘key’ are abstract in the sense introduced in Section 2 
and need fitting out in every particular instance. In order to understand how a particular 
representation works, we need to account for how the particular X comes to denote the 
particular Y, and we have to provide a particular key K. In the above example, we borrowed 
denotation from ordinary language by saying ‘this is a map of North London’, and the key 
                                                
46 Nautical maps, for instance, use the Mercator projection system and do not preserve distances; they preserve 
angles and one obtains wrong results when translating the distance between two points on a map into the 
distance between two locations. And this mistake has been made over and over again. As Sismondo and 
Chrisman (2001, 42-43) point out, about half of a sample of 137 international maritime boundaries are not where 
they were meant to be. When diplomats met to drawn the boundaries between territories they had these charts on 
the table. They intended draw the border half way between two territories and so they drew the line on the map 
mid-point between the territories. This is mistake: even relatively close to the equator the line thus drawn can be 
over 7km away from the actual line of equidistance. 
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was provided to us by cartography. But other cases may work differently since there may be 
different sources of denotation and there may be any number of keys that can be used to 
interpret X. Moreover, keys are often implicit and determined by context. This is often the 
case with scientific representations, which unlike maps, rarely, if ever, come with something 
like a legend. It is one of the challenges facing a philosophical analysis of representation to 
make hidden assumptions explicit, and present a clear statement of them. So there is much 
more to be said about t-representation than is contained in (R1) and (R2) – they are merely 
blanks be filled in in every particular instance. Thus, the claim that something is a t-
representation amounts to an invitation to spell out what how exactly X comes to denote Y and 
what K is.  
 
Nonetheless, this generality is an advantage. The class of t-representations is large and its 
members varied. A view that claims that all t-representations work in exactly the same way 
would be doomed to failure right from the beginning. Maps, graphs, architectural plans, 
diagrams, photographs, (certain kinds of) paintings and drawings, and of course scientific 
models, are all t-representations in that they satisfy (R1) and (R2), but they work in very 
different ways. The differences between them are that these conditions are realised in very 
different ways: different keys are used and denotation has different sources. The challenge for 
a complete account of representation is to come up with a taxonomy of different ways in 
which the two conditions can be realised, and to explain how they differ from each other. 
Needless to say, this is a Herculean task that I cannot undertake here since there are many 
different kinds of keys. That said, the value of this account of representation is that it provides 
us with a framework in which to discuss these questions.47  
 
A second qualification I would wish to add to the scheme sketched above is to note that there 
is one important disanalogy between maps and scientific models: where their respective keys 
come from. In the case of the map we have the target system in front of us, we explore it 
directly (by taking measurements, etc.) and then we construct the map. So a map is an elegant 
summary of what someone already knows, and its sole purpose is to effectively summarise 
this knowledge and communicate it to those who are not in the business of land surveying. 
                                                
47 In passing I would like to point out that this account of representation satisfies the conditions of adequacy that 
I presented in my (2006). The ontological puzzle is addressed by the account of model-systems presented in 
Section 5. The enigma of representation is met by (R1) and (R2). The problem of style now becomes the 
question of how denotation works and what keys are used. 
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Science is not like this; we do not first survey the hydrogen atom and then construct a model 
to communicate the findings to those not yet familiar with it. We typically construct models to 
find out something genuinely new about the target system; something that no one yet knows.  
 
This disanalogy does not undermine the saliency of t-representation for our analysis of 
modelling. Even if the process of constructing a model involves much more than elegantly 
summarising observations, once the model-system is constructed (no matter how!) we have to 
specify how it relates to the world, and this is done by providing a key. However, unlike for 
maps where we know the key by construction (we have used a certain projection method, 
certain symbols, etc. when drawing the map), in the case of models the key has the character 
of a hypothesis.48 We stipulate that we expect the model to bear this or that relation to its 
target, and then evaluate this claim against the best available background knowledge and by 
subjecting it to test using the usual methods of scientific investigation. How exactly this is 
done depends on the details of the representation. That is, it depends on the key used and the 
nature of the denotation relation (for instance, an assessment of the accuracy of a key for 
model in elementary particle physics will be very different from the assessment of an 
engineering model of a bridge). Understanding these processes should be part of a future 
investigation into the nature of different kinds of t-representations (cf. the first qualification). 
For now it is sufficient to point out that keys can be hypothetical, and that this does not 
undermine the status of models as t-representations.  
 
Third, (R2) states that we need a key specifying how to translate facts about X into claims 
about Y. This is not a slip. An acceptable definition of t-representation has to make room for 
misrepresentation. A map can contain errors in the sense that even if we use the right key and 
use it correctly we may obtain wrong results. For instance, it might have happened that the 
cartographers failed to connect the black dot and the black rectangle with a yellow line, and so 
we would have been led to believe that the two stations are not connected by a main road. 
This would not have turned the map into a non-t-representation; it would still have been a t-
representation, but one that misrepresents North London. Saying that we translate facts about 
the map into claims about the target makes room for error because claims can be true or false, 
                                                
48 Although this is reminiscent of Giere’s claim that models are connected to their target systems with a 
‘theoretical hypothesis’ (1988, 80), the point is a different one. In Giere’s account we call a claim to the effect 
that the model is similar to the target in specific way a theoretical hypothesis; the current view, by contrast, 
emphasises the hypothetical – fallible, tentative, and conjectural – character of keys attributed to a model.  
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while facts cannot. A representation is a faithful representation iff if all claims about Y are 
true.  
 
There is now also a straightforward way to draw a delineation between cases of 
misrepresentation and cases of failure of representation. X is a misrepresentation if it is not 
faithful (and notice that misrepresentation comes in degrees!). Something is not a t-
representation at all if either of the two conditions fails. We have a failure of (R1) if there is 
no target system; a map of Atlantis fails to be a t-representation of Atlantis because there is no 
Atlantis, and hence Atlantis cannot be denoted. By contrast, the failure can be put down on 
condition (R2) if X it has no intrinsic properties that are interpreted by using a key. This is 
why proper names, for instance, are not t-representations: they denote the bearer of the name, 
but there is no key that translates properties the name itself possess into claims about the 
bearer of the name. If, for some reason, one wants to call proper names ‘representations’ then 
one can do so, but it is important to realise that they are not t-representations, and being a t-
representation is what matters both in the case of maps and in the case of scientific models.  
 
With this in mind we can see what is wrong with Callender and Cohen’s (2006) argument that 
there is no special problem about scientific representation. Because scientific representation 
comes down to an act of arbitrary stipulation, by their reading, explaining how we make such 
stipulations lies in the province of philosophy of mind and not in the realm of philosophy of 
science at all. They ask: ‘Can the salt shaker on the dinner table represent Madagascar?’, and 
immediately reply ‘Of course it can, so long as you stipulate that the former represents the 
latter. […] Can your left hand represent the Platonic form of beauty? Of course, so long as 
you stipulate that the former represents the latter.’ (ibid, 73-74). If all you mean by 
representation is denotation, then this is correct. But for something to be a t-representation, 
more than mere denotation is needed. We would need a key telling us how to translate certain 
properties of the salt-shaker into claims about Madagascar, or properties about my left hand 
into properties about the Platonic form of beauty, which, by their own admission, we don’t.49  
 
Why it is so important to be a t-representation, and why is simple stipulation not enough? The 
answer to this question is that maps as well as scientific representations belong to a category 
of representations that function cognitively: we study X to learn something about Y that we 
did not already know. In fact, model-systems are the units on which significant parts of 
                                                
49 For a more extensive discussion of Callender and Cohen’s argument see Toon (2009). 
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scientific investigation are carried out rather than on the target system itself: we study a model 
and thereby discover features of the thing it stands for. For instance, we study the nature of 
the hydrogen atom, the dynamics of populations, or the behaviour of polymers by studying 
their respective models. We do this by first finding out what is true in the model-system itself 
(cf. Sec. 5), and then translating the findings into claims about the target itself. This is 
possible only if the model-system is a t-representation in the above sense. Denotation is not 
enough for this to happen. Proper names don’t inform us about the properties of things they 
stand for; we can turn and twist ‘hydrogen’ as long as we wish, but we won’t thereby learn 
anything about hydrogen.  
 
As I mentioned above, I regard the detailed study of different keys as a research programme 
to be undertaken in the future. However, to get a better idea of what such an investigation 
involves I now want to discuss two keys often used in science: identity and ideal limits. The 
simplest of all keys is identity, the rule according to which facts in the model (or at least a 
suitably defined class of facts) are also facts in the world. For example, if X t-represents Y by 
identity, then it follows from the fact that X has discrete energy levels that Y has discrete 
energy levels too. Although scientists often talk as if the relation between models and reality 
was identity, there are actually very few, if any, models that work in this way.  
 
A more interesting key the ideal limit key. Many model-systems are idealisations of the target 
in one way or another. A common kind of idealisations is to ‘push to the extreme’ a property 
that a system possesses. This happens when we model particles as point masses, strings as 
massless, planets as spherical, and surfaces as frictionless. Two things are needed to render 
such idealisations benign: experimental refinements and convergence (Laymon 1991). First, 
there must be the possibility of in principle refining actual systems in a way that they are 
made to approach the postulated limit (that is, we don’t actually have to produce these 
systems; what matters is that we in principle could produce them). With respect to friction, for 
instance, one has to find a series of experimental refinements that render a tabletop ever 
smoother and hence allow real systems to come ever closer to the ideal frictionless surface. 
These experimental refinements together constitute a sequence of systems that come ever 
closer to the ideal limit. Second, this sequence has to behave ‘correctly’: the closer the 
properties of a system come to the ideal limit, the closer its behaviour has to come to the 
behaviour in the limit. If we take the motion of a spinning top on a frictionless surface to be 
the ideal limit of the motion of the same spinning top on a non-frictionless surface, then we 
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have to require that the less friction there is, the closer the motion of the real top comes to the 
one of the idealised model. Or to put it in more instrumental terms, the closer the real situation 
comes to the ideal limit, the more accurate the predictions of the model. This is the 
requirement of convergence. If there exists such a sequence of refinements and if the limit is 
monotonic, then the model is an ideal limit.  
 
If a model is an ideal limit, this implies a key. To see how, let us first briefly recapitulate the 
mathematical definition of a limit. Consider a function f(x), and then ask the question how f(x) 
behaves if x approaches a particular value x0. We say that the number F is the limit of f(x) (in 
symbols: Fxfxx =→ )(lim 0 ) iff for every positive number ε (no matter how small), there exists 
another positive number δ such that: if ⎢x – x0 ⎢< δ, then  ⎢f(x) – F ⎢< ε. Colloquially, this says 
that the closer x comes to x0, the closer f(x) comes to F: if we know that x is less than δ way 
from x0, then we also know that f(x) is less than ε away from F. This idea can now be used for 
ideal limits in the above sense. The sequence of experimental refinements plays the role of x, 
and the ideal limit itself is x0 (in the example: the ever smoother table tops correspond to 
different values of x, and the frictionless plane corresponds to x0). The behaviour of the object 
corresponds to f. If there is a limit we know that if the difference between the friction of the 
real plane and the ideal frictionless plane is smaller than δ, then difference between the 
behaviour of the real spinning top and the ideal spinning top in the model-system is smaller 
than ε. So if we are given the friction of the table, we know how to translate facts obtaining in 
the model-system into claims about the world.50  
 
Of course not all model-systems are ideal limits of their target-systems in this sense.51 For 
instance, we cannot possibly produce a sequence of systems in which Planck’s constant 
approaches zero. In other cases it may not be clear whether there are such limits. For instance, 
mathematical knot theory is a branch of topology and as such it deals with one-dimensional 
                                                
50 I have smuggled in a premise here: that it makes sense to quantify differences in the friction of surfaces and 
the behaviour of spinning tops in terms of numbers. This is not implausible and could be made precise, for 
instance, by using friction coefficients and a geometrical measure for the closeness of trajectories. The following 
two questions are more pressing. First, how can we know whether or not a certain model-system is an ideal limit 
of the target at hand? Second, what is the relation between ε and δ? In real applications on would like to know 
how close to the limit one would have to come to get a result that is precise to a particular degree. Typical 
mathematical existence results are of no help here. These are open questions that need to be addressed.  
51 This corresponds to Rohrlich’s distinction between factual and counterfactual limits (1989, 1165). 
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strings. But physical strings have finite width. Hence the question arises whether, and if yes, 
in what sense the results of mathematical knot theory carry over to physical situations. So it is 
an open question how to translate facts in idealised systems into claims about a real-world 
target if they are not ideal limits – or in the current idiom: there is a question about what they 
key is – one that should preoccupy us in the future. 
 
 
7. Re-Reading the Newtonian Model of the Sun-Earth System 
 
Case studies are the touchstone of philosophical analysis, and so it is imperative to show that 
the account developed in this chapter can shed light on typical cases of scientific modelling. 
For this reason I now discuss a standard example of a scientific model – the Newtonian model 
of the sun-earth system – and show that the fiction view not only has the resources to explain 
what happens in this case, but also makes features of the model visible that are usually 
overlooked. Hence, the fiction view of models, far from being an idle philosophical pastime, 
is actually a powerful tool to help us to better understand what is involved in scientific 
models.  
 
The aim of the Newtonian model is to determine the orbit of the earth moving around the 
sun.52 We first posit that the only force relevant to the earth’s motion its gravitational 
interaction with the sun, and we neglect all other forces, most notably the gravitational 
interaction with the other planets in the solar system. This force is given by Newton’s law of 
gravity, 2/ rmmGF spg = , where pm  and sm are the masses of the earth and the sun 
respectively, r the distance between the two, and G  the constant of gravitation. We then 
make the idealising assumption that both the sun and the earth are perfect spheres with a 
homogeneous mass distribution (i.e. the mass is evenly distributed over the sphere), which 
allows us treat their gravitational interaction as if mass of both spheres was concentrated in 
their centre. The sun’s mass is vastly larger than the earth’s and so we assume that the sun is 
at rest and the earth orbits around it. Now we turn to classical mechanics and use Newton’s 
equation of motion, amF 

= , where a
  is the acceleration of a particle, m  its mass and F

 the 
force acting on it. Placing the sun at the origin of the coordinate system and plugging in the 
                                                
52 See, for instance, Feynman, Leighton, and Sands (1963, Secs. 9.7 and 13.4) and Young and Freedman (2000, 
Ch. 12).  
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above force law we obtain 3/ xxmGx s
 −= , the differential equation describing the earth’s 
trajectory (where we have, of course, used xa  = , i.e. that the acceleration is equal to the 
second derivative of the position). This equation can be solved and we find that the earth 
moves on an elliptic orbit around the sun.  
 
When we read the above description, which tells us to regard the earth and the sun as ideal 
homogeneous spheres gravitationally interacting only with each other, this description serves 
as a prop and we engage in an authorised game of make believe. We imagine the entity 
described in the description, where the rules of direct generation are just the rules of ordinary 
English. We understand the terms occurring in the description and we imagine an entity which 
has all the properties that the description specifies. The result of this process is the model-
system, the fictional scenario which is the vehicle of our reasoning: an imagined entity 
consisting of two spheres, etc. The part of the above description that prescribes us to imagine 
the model-system is the model-description. Now focus on the formal apparatus. 
3/ xxmGx s
 −=  is the model-equation, which, in this case, is obtained from a general theory – 
Newtonian mechanics – by specifying the number of particles and their interaction. This 
equation specifies a model-structure, which is instantiated in the model-system (cf. Section 6). 
A proper analysis of the structure described by this equation would require formal techniques 
that are beyond chapter.53 But for our purposes nothing hinges on giving all the details (since 
our concern here is not the applicability of mathematics); what matters at this point is only 
that such analysis can be given and that its upshot is that the model-equation applies to the 
model-system (and is literally true of it). The model-equation then is the formal expression of 
a principle of indirect generation. Using this principle we find that it is true in the model-
system that the light sphere orbits around the heavy sphere on an elliptical orbit. This is an 
implied truth because it has not been written into the model-description; it is something that 
we infer from the basic features of the model-system (as given by the model-description) and 
the rule of generation.  
 
The next step is to connect our model to the target-system. We find clues about how to do this 
in the above description. Right at the beginning we are told that the model we are constructing 
is a model of the sun-earth system. This establishes denotation, which is condition (R1). As in 
                                                
53 Such an analysis can be found in Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987, 29-34, 103-108, 180-191), Frigg (2003, 
Ch. 8), and Muller (1998, 259-66).  
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the above examples, we borrow denotation from ordinary language by using the expressions 
‘sun’ and ‘earth’, which we take to refer to the relevant heavenly bodies. Should these 
expressions for some reason fail to refer, then t-representation would fail too. Ordinary 
language also plays a role is specifying the key. The first element of the key is the definition 
of an object-to-object correlation: we say that the light sphere in the model-system 
corresponds to the earth and the heavy one to the sun. Now things get more involved. We 
have made several idealisations (that the sun and the earth are spherical, that there are no 
forces other than the gravitational interaction of sun and earth, etc.) and we now have to say 
how these should be understood. Unfortunately physics texts usually do not say much about 
this question, or remain altogether silent about it. So at this point we have to appeal to 
philosophical theories of idealisation and the keys they imply. On a plausible reading of the 
Newtonian model, the idealisations made are taken to be ideal limits in the sense discussed in 
the last section. The limit is complex and involves many properties, but the leading idea is 
that we could – in principle – produce a sequence of systems where the forces acting on the 
sun and the earth become increasingly smaller and eventually converges towards zero (which 
would be done by taking more and more matter out of the universe). We can then also – 
again, in principle – produce a sequence of sun-earth systems in which the sun and the earth 
become ever rounder and their mass distributions ever more homogeneous. The claim then is 
that, first, in the limit the sequence of these systems converges towards the model-system 
(which is true by construction); second, the behaviour of the systems in this sequence 
converges towards the behaviour of the model-system (this is the ideal limit). Given this, we 
know how to translate claims about the model into claims about the target: if the actual target 
is less than δ away from the model-system, then the behaviour of the actual target is less than 
ε away from the behaviour of the model-system. This is (R2).  
 
Asserting convergence between sequence and system constitutes a substantial claim that does 
not follow from the construction of the sequence. In fact, we have cannot strictly prove that 
this is so. This illustrates the hypothetical character of keys: they are postulated as a 
hypothesis and not given to us as in the case of the map. However, this does not mean that any 
hypothesis is as good as any other. We justify the stipulation of the ideal limit key (rather than 
another key) in two ways. First we appeal to background knowledge: we have tested the law 
of gravity and Newton’s equation of motion in countless situations and have good reasons to 
assume that it provides true descriptions in scenarios like the model-system. We derive 
predictions from the model-system (the trajectory of the earth) and compare them with 
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observations. At this point the ideal limit key becomes essential. If we have in ideal limit, then 
we know how the behaviour of the model-system relates to the behaviour of the target. 
Assume now we can sensibly quantify such distances (cf. footnote 50) and, given what we 
know about the universe, the forces and masses are such that the actual target-system is less 
than δ away from the model-system, then we can compare the theoretical trajectories of the 
earth with the observed ones and see whether they are less than ε away from each other. If this 
is the case, then this confirms our hypothesis that the model-system is an ideal limit. But 
notice – to come back to the point made in Section 2 – that what the model-system represents 
is not data, nor is there anything in the model that is directly comparable to data. The data 
used to confirm the model are obtained with the aid of specific observational techniques 
(optical telescopes, radio telescopes, etc.) and the character of the data varies with these 
techniques. Given a particular technique (and the theories behind it), the model can be used to 
calculate what one would have to observe; but the result of this calculation is not in any way 
part of the make-up of the model.  
 
With all this in place, we can then start translating facts about the model-system into claims 
about the world. For instance, calculations reveal that the model-earth move on ellipses, and 
given that the model-system is an ideal limit of the target we can infer that real earth move on 
trajectories that are almost ellipses (or more precisely, on trajectories that are not more than ε 
away from an ellipse). 
 
This is a complete analysis of the model of the sun-earth system. Hence, we see that the 
fiction view of models is able to provide us with a complete account of how scientific models 
work, and it can do so without having to go at great length to reconstruct scientific practice in 
terms of a particular revisionary philosophy (such as the structuralist programme). First 
appearances notwithstanding, the fiction view of models is close to scientific practice and 
provides an analysis of modelling that scientists would recognise. The fiction view of models, 
then, is an account of scientific modelling that is both philosophically well founded and close 
to scientific practice –the kind of account of modelling that we have been looking for.  
 
 
10. Conclusion  
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I have argued that scientific modelling shares important aspects in common with literary 
fiction, and that therefore theories of fiction can be brought to bear on issues in connection 
with modelling. I have identified six such issues and suggested that pretence theory offers 
satisfactory responses to them. From this discussion emerges a general picture of scientific 
modelling, which views scientific modelling as a complex activity involving the elements 
shown in Figure 1. I have then used the analogy with maps to present the broad outlines of an 
account of t-representation and have shown how this account can be used to analyse how a 
typical model in physics, the Newtonian model of the sun-earth system, represents. 
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